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In 1996 less than 1% of the populationowned and controlled over 80%1 offarm land.2 This 1% was part of the
10.9% of the population classified as white
(Stats SA 2000). Meanwhile, the 76.7% of
the population that is classified as African
had access to less than 15% of agricultural
land, and even that access was without
clear ownership or legally-recognised
rights. An estimated 5.3 million black
South Africans lived with almost no tenure
security on commercial farms owned by
white farmers (Wildschut & Hulbert 1998).
The legacy of apartheid was not just the
inequality in access to resources such as
land, but a faltering economy that by 1994
had been through two years of negative
growth and left the majority of the
population in poverty (Sparks 2003).
Policy makers pre- and post-1994 took an
interest in arguments that land reform
could play a significant role in boosting
economic growth and alleviating poverty.
World Bank and other advisors in South
Africa in the early nineties argued for a
far-reaching land reform programme on
these grounds (Greenberg 2003).
Arguments that increased productivity and
job creation could result from reducing
farm sizes were supported by a number of
local and international scholars (Van Zyl et
al. 1996).
The need for land reforms to address
the legacy of the past was clearly identified
in the new South African Constitution (Act
108 of 1996, Section 25). The Reconstruc-
tion and Development Programme (RDP)
identified land reform as a key component
of its programmes of ‘meeting basic needs’
and ‘building the economy’ (ANC 1994).
The White Paper on South African Land
Policy included in its strategic goals the
promotion of economic growth and
poverty reduction through land reform
(DLA 1997).
Over the last decade land reform
policies around the world have, with a few
exceptions such as the case of Zimbabwe,
revolved around variations of market-
based land reform. This trend fits with
broader shifts in global economic policies,
following the end of the Cold War, that
have seen a reduced role for the state,
liberalisation of markets and privatisation
of state enterprises and assets (Williams
1996; Greenberg 2003). It is within this
context that the first democratically elected
government in South Africa followed
international trends and World Bank
advice by adopting a market-based ap-
proach to land reform (Williams 1996).
A range of civil society organisations,
including social movements, NGOs and
trade unions, have raised strong criticisms
of market-based land reforms around the
world. They have argued that this model
will not benefit small producers and the
rural poor, but serve to tighten the control
of powerful land owners and concentrate
land in the hands of those with financial
and political power (El-Gonemy 1999:125;
Ghimire 1999:23; Greenberg 2003:22).
The South African land reform
programme, developed by the African
Chapter 1: Introduction
The land question remains one of the key challenges for post-apartheid
South Africa. The history of colonisation and apartheid, and the
dispossession of black people from the land that are central to this
history, are well documented (Thompson 1995; Koch et al. 2001;
Sparks 1991; Greenberg 2003).
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National Congress government that won
the first democratic elections in 1994,
comprises three main programmes:
restitution, tenure reform and redistribu-
tion. This study focuses on redistribution.
Redistribution is of particular interest as it
is the only programme ‘specifically aimed
at transforming the racial pattern of land
ownership’ (Jacobs et al. 2003:4).
The White Paper on South African Land
Policy stipulated that land redistribution
would be implemented through a ‘willing
buyer-willing seller’ approach in terms of
which land would be acquired through
purchases at market rates from owners
who agreed to sell. The first version of the
redistribution programme, implemented
from 1995, involved the Department
of Land Affairs (DLA) providing a Settle-
ment/Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) to
assist the poor with land purchases (DLA
1997). This was largely replaced in 2000
by the Land Redistribution for Agricultural
Development (LRAD) programme that
removed poverty as a criterion for bene-
ficiary selection and focused more on
creating black commercial farmers. This
shift was in line with changes in South
African economic policy that took on a
more market- and investor-friendly
direction with the adoption of the Growth
Employment and Redistribution (Gear)
policy in 1996 (Department of Finance
1997).
Critics of the LRAD programme claim
it will not meet its targets for redistribution
of land, nor shift the basic structure of
agriculture, it will merely change the racial
composition of land owners, and will, at
best, benefit only a small minority of the
already privileged (Tilley 2002; NLC
2003). This is in line with international
critiques of market-based land reform.
Authors such as Borras (2003:389–90) and
Ghimire (1999:23–4) have argued that
market-based land reform models will
never bring the far-reaching changes in
property rights and power relations that are
required, and will only benefit those
already better off who are best able to
access the market and the opportunities
presented by such programmes. Despite
Figure 1: The homelands of South Africa before 1994
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the critiques of LRAD there has been
almost no documentation on the effective-
ness of LRAD in achieving its objectives
or its contribution to the broader objectives
of land reform.
The focus of this report is market-based
land reform. The topic is addressed pri-
marily through a critical examination of
the implementation of LRAD in Limpopo
province. Chapter 2 discusses some of the
main land reform debates and experiences
in order to locate LRAD within the context
of market-based land reforms internation-
ally and in South Africa. Chapter 3
presents the methodology used for this
study, while Chapter 4 provides a brief
background to the study area. Chapter 5
explains the LRAD policy, the structures
and procedures used for its implementation
in Limpopo, and some of the achievements
of the programme. Chapter 6 presents the
information gathered on individual LRAD
projects, primarily information gathered
directly from the beneficiaries through
interviews and site visits. Finally, Chapter
7 presents an analysis of the findings,
raising some concerns about the pro-
gramme while also acknowledging what
it has achieved.
This compilation and analysis of
empirical information on the implemen-
tation and impact of LRAD is intended to
contribute to ongoing debates about LRAD
and the relevance of market-based land
reforms in South Africa.
Endnotes
1. Total hectares of farmland owned as commercial
farming units (82 209 571ha) as a percentage of total
farmland (100 665 792ha). Figures sourced from
Development Bank of Southern Africa and N Vink,
Chair: Department of Agricultural Economics at
Stellenbosch University.
2. Calculated from population, farm unit and
agricultural land figures.
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Contemporary redistributive
land reform
Arguments for land reformprogrammes typically revolvearound issues of equity, poverty
reduction, economic development and
political stability (DLA 1997). Land
reforms are also seen by some as important
in contributing to human freedoms, civil
liberties and sustainable democracies
(Prosterman & Riedinger 1987:88–91;
World Bank 2003:xvii, 16). Access to land
remains critical for people’s very survival
in most developing countries where ‘land
is the primary means for generating a
livelihood’ (World Bank 2003:xix). During
the 20th century many governments
developed land reform policies to meet
these objectives and to try and deal in a
controlled way with the demands and
tensions around land.
Governments in post-colonial states
have found themselves under particular
pressures with regard to the land reform
they could implement. They have had to
consolidate their newfound power, take
control of land for development purposes,
respond to the interests of traditional and
emerging local elites, and meet the needs
of the majority of the rural poor (Toulmin
& Quan  2000:8, 11).
In Africa there has been a lot of
continuity from colonial to post-colonial
land reforms. For example the Kenyan
land reforms that were started by the
British rulers in the 1950s were continued
with even greater vigour by the first post-
independence government (Okoth-Ogendo
1993:262). The reasons for this continuity,
according to Okoth-Ogendo, were the
weak nature of many post-colonial states,
constitutions that preserved existing
institutions and laws, the extent and
influence of foreign investments, and the
need to earn foreign exchange (Okoth-
Ogendo 1993:261–4).
Many of the reforms initiated in the
colonial era focused on tenure upgrading
and village re-organisation, rather than a
redistribution of land (Okoth-Ogendo
1993:262–3). However in the 1960s the
British also initiated a large-scale
redistribution of land in Kenya out of fear
that there would be a wave of land
seizures. The Million Hectare Scheme
involved the acquisition of 1.5 million
hectares by the state from colonial
landowners and the settlement of 34 000
families on this land by 1971 (Bruce
1993:42).
In many other African countries
independent governments implemented
their own radical and redistributive land
reforms. In the 1970s the Marxist regime
in Ethiopia abolished the feudal system
of landholding, nationalised all land, and
distributed it to those willing to work it
(Okoth-Ogendo 1993:265). In Mozam-
bique the abandonment of farms by the
Portuguese at independence made the
nationalisation of land relatively easy. The
land was split between state farms, co-
operative farms, and the distribution of
land to individuals through a registered
licence to land that left the state with an
overriding power (Okoth-Ogendo 1993:
265). Land was nationalised through
Chapter 2: International land
reform debates
This chapter situates the LRAD programme, as the primary land
redistribution programme in South Africa, within the debate around land
reform internationally, with a focus on market-based land redistribution.
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legislation in a number of other countries
such as Tanzania, Guinea, Sudan, Mali,
Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Zaire, Uganda,
Somalia and Zambia (Bruce 1993:24).
Post-independence Zimbabwe was
constrained in its redistribution of land by
shortages of cash and the Lancaster House
agreement that prohibited expropriation of
land without paying market-value
compensation (Ghimire 1999). Despite this
the Zimbabwean government acquired 2.7
million hectares during the 1980s, most of
which was allocated to 52 000 black
families who were issued with land-use
permits (Bruce 1993:28).
Radical land reforms have not been
confined to Africa. All land above a set
ceiling for maximum landholding was
acquired through compulsory purchases
by the governments of Taiwan, South
Korea and Japan during the 1940s and
50s. Some compensation was paid, but at a
rate well below market value. The peasant
farmers were assisted with the purchase, at
nominal prices, through the provision of
credit (Griffin et al. 2002:303–9). In China
and Vietnam landlords were overthrown
after the seizure of power through
revolutionary action. China and Vietnam
followed similar paths of land seizure,
distribution of land to poor peasants
followed by collectivisation of production
and, in the 1980s, a return of the land to
peasant families who were found to be
more productive than the collectives
(Griffin et al. 2002:313).
Land reforms in the 20th century that
have been successful in increasing
productivity and reducing poverty1 have
largely involved breaking up large
landholdings. Ownership of small pieces
of arable land was given to tenants who
already worked the land but previously
had to pay rents or share their crops with a
landlord. These peasant farmers, freed
from the burden of the landlord, utilised
the land more intensively thus increasing
productivity, creating employment, and
reducing poverty (Griffin et al. 2002).
Land reforms involving the transfer of
land from ‘haciendas’ – large estates or
plantations – to peasants or labourers, as
has been attempted in Latin America and
parts of Asia and Africa, have been far less
successful (World Bank 2003:143;
Binswanger & Deininger 1996:75).
However, as mentioned above,
positive impacts have been reported
from countries such as Kenya and
Zimbabwe in the early phases of
their post-independence land
reforms. (World Bank 2003:xl).
Agriculture, the economy and
poverty reduction
One of the strongest arguments for re-
distributive land reform is that it can create
an environment for growth in agricultural
production that will in turn support broader
economic growth and have a positive im-
pact on poverty reduction. Such arguments
are supported by information showing that
countries with a more equitable distribu-
tion of land tend to have higher levels of
economic growth, while high levels of
land concentration are often associated
with less efficient resource utilisation
(World Bank 2003:18–20).
The growth in agricultural production
that has been attributed to land reforms
has come from the de-concentration of
landholding to create or strengthen small-
scale owner-operated or family farms.
Prosterman and Riedinger, amongst others,
have argued that there is an inverse farm
size-efficiency relationship in which
smaller farms, where the producer has a
secure owner or owner-like relationship to
the land, produce a substantially better
return per hectare and on investments than
any other model of agricultural production
(Prosterman & Riedinger 1987:46–9).
They also argue that such analysis of
productivity probably hides the full extent
of the advantage of the owner-operator
system as it is based on only the main
crops and does not take into account the
variety of other crops normally grown on
small owner-operated farms (Prosterman &
Riedinger 1987:58–66).
Other reasons offered for the beneficial
affects of redistributive land reform are the
6
A critical appraisal of South Africa’s
market-based land reform policy
breaking of control of labour by large
landlords (Griffin et al. 2002:287), a better
total factor productivity of small farmers,
the labour-intensive nature of small farms
(Griffin et al. 2002:286; Prosterman &
Riedinger 1987; Wilson & Ramphele
1989:311), and the large contribution of
agricultural growth to the non-farm rural
sector (Mellor 1999:23; Van Zyl et al.
1996:5).
Studies in countries from Sierra Leone
to India and Malaysia show that growth in
agriculture makes a significantly larger
contribution to overall economic growth
than growth in other sectors such as
industry (Mellor 1999:8). Growth in
agriculture also has a disproportionately
positive impact on poverty levels. Part of
the reason for this can be found in the
labour-intensive nature of agricultural
production and the large proportion of
people in the lower income bracket who
participate in agriculture. It was found in
a study of 27 low to middle-income
countries that agriculture accounted for
only 25% of GDP (gross domestic
product), but 51% of the labour force
(Mellor 1999:9). Not only is agriculture a
large employer, it is a large employer of
the poor. Thus a relatively small increase
in growth in agriculture will have a large
positive impact on employment and
incomes for the poor. An assessment by
Prosterman and Riedinger of poverty
indicators across more than 120 countries
showed that those that adopted the family-
farm model of development fared
consistently better than others (1987:
74–9, 100–1).
Market-based land reform2
The primary mode of redistributive land
reform over the last decade has been
market-based land reform and debates
have increasingly revolved around the
merits and disadvantages of this approach
(Borras 2003:367). The market-based
approach has been particularly strongly
pushed by the World Bank on the basis
that this is the only form of land reform
that is compatible with its economic
policies and those of the International
Monetary Fund (El-Ghonemy 1999:106).
 The market-based approach has been
bolstered by critiques of the state-led land
reform programmes of the past (Borras
2003:367). The risk of landlord resistance
to the forced seizure of land is argued to
be counter-productive to land reforms.
Interventions such as setting maximum
landholding sizes have been hard to
enforce and have had negative effects such
as reducing the ability to use land as
collateral for loans (World Bank 2003:
124–5). Further problems have been the
drop in productivity on land inappropri-
ately divided up and, in some cases, given
to beneficiaries without the potential to
become effective producers. Programmes
have focused on the land redistribution
process without giving attention to mea-
sures such as farmer support to ensure
effective production (World Bank 2003:
146). Bloated bureaucracies, needed to
drive state-led land reforms, are expensive
and inefficient, have little understanding of
local dynamics, and often end up stifling
land reform due to the development of
their own interests (Borras 2003:368).
Fiscal arguments against state-led land
reforms suggest that they are too expen-
sive as the beneficiaries do not contribute
and the state has to pay for the land and
other support services. In addition, the
bureaucracies necessary for implemen-
tation consume a substantial portion of the
budget, the state has often ended up
paying more than market value for land,
and this approach has contributed to other
distortions that have pushed up prices
(Borras 2003:370; World Bank 2003:153).
In the face of these critiques, it is
claimed that the market-based land reform
model offers an efficient way to enhance
equity in asset distribution. The key
features of the ‘market-led’ land reform
model according to Borras (2003:370–3)
are: landlord co-operation in the form of
voluntary land sales (encouraged by
payment of full market prices); production
of ‘viable farm plans’ before land is pur-
chased; and programme financing through
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the flexible provision of loans and grants.
Essential to the market-based approach is
the liberalisation of the agricultural sector
to remove distortions in various land and
agriculture-related markets, especially
those that favour or have been captured by
large farmers and elites. Pro-market
economists argue that liberalisation will
lead to a de-concentration of landholdings
since distortions have favoured land-
holdings larger than the optimal size
(Borras 2003:372; Binswanger & Deinin-
ger 1996:68–9; World Bank 2003:
155; Van Zyl et al. 1996; Williams 1996).
Proponents of market-based land redistri-
bution acknowledge that:
(t)he land market cannot be
expected to lead to an efficiency-
enhancing redistribution of land
because poor family farmers who do
not have much equity cannot acquire
land even if they have access to
mortgage credit (Binswanger &
Deininger 1996:70).
This is because market prices are, for a
range of reasons, higher than the pro-
duction value of land.3 Therefore, the role
of the state in facilitating land purchases at
market prices is to provide a grant to sub-
sidise the buyer: ‘such a grant element is
required to provide the equity that the poor
do not have’ (Binswanger & Deininger
1996:71).
Another key element of the market-
based approach is the self-selection of
beneficiaries who are best equipped to
make good use of the land. Strategies to
facilitate this self-selection are a demand-
led approach, which only responds to
those who request land, and requires
potential beneficiaries to work as a group.
It is assumed that applicants in a group will
know each other and therefore exclude
those who they know are less likely to be
effective members of the group (Borras
2003:371). Requiring beneficiaries to
contribute is suggested to ensure only
those with commitment are involved, while
also encouraging a sense of project
ownership (Binswanger & Deininger
1996:93).
Decentralised delivery mechanisms –
preferably with some form of local
government involvement – strong roles
for non-government and private sector
service providers, and a community-based
approach are also recommendations
common to the market-based approach
(Bernstein 2002:447–8; Borras 2003:371).
According to the World Bank (2003:156),
‘the implementation of any land reform
programme should be decentralized, with
potential beneficiaries and communities
taking a lead’.
 The provision of grants to beneficiaries
to buy privatised extension and support
services for farm planning and production
is seen as the route to cost-effective provi-
sion of the necessary expertise. However,
government support for the development
of technology and extension ‘at least in the
initial stage’ is not ruled out (World Bank
2003:156; Binswanger & Deininger 1996:
93). It is assumed that the private sector
will become more active in providing credit
if beneficiaries become outright owners of
their land and once they have established
themselves as successful commercial
farmers (Borras 2003:372). For land to be
used as collateral it is considered impera-
tive that there be as few limitations as
possible on sales and rentals of the land by
the beneficiaries (Van Zyl et al. 1996:17;
World Bank 2003:155).
Financing of land redistribution is to be
in the form of beneficiary contributions
and government grants and loans.
Economists argue that the provision of
grants rather than subsidies on loans and
other inputs will have less of a distorting
effect on the economy and be more easily
managed and transparent (Borras 2003:
373). The required funding is expected to
come from a combination of government
contribution from the fiscus (some of this
available from savings made through the
reduction or elimination of existing
subsidies) and from international donors
and aid agencies (Van den Brink et al.
1996:449–51).
There is general agreement that there is
a need to target the poor, primarily through
8
A critical appraisal of South Africa’s
market-based land reform policy
‘targeted financial assistance to poor
buyers’ (Van Zyl et al. 1996:17). Other
support such as training and technical
assistance should also be ‘explicitly
targeted toward the poor’ (World Bank
2003:156). Without targeting there is a risk
of elites ‘capturing’ opportunities and
resources leading to inefficiencies and
reducing the positive impact on poverty
alleviation.
Critiques of market-based land
reform
One of the strongest attacks on market-
based approaches to land reform is the
argument that it will not lead to substantial
change in land distribution. Even the
World Bank (2003:15–6) notes that
‘(a)ttempts at land reform without massive
political upheaval have rarely succeeded in
transferring much of a country’s land’.
It is notable that none of the abovemen-
tioned land reforms that were successful in
bringing a substantial de-concentration of
landholding and the related benefits
claimed by proponents of market-based
land reform were able to achieve this
through a market-based approach. The
transfers were mostly based on the con-
fiscation of land with compensation at
considerably below market value. Griffin
et al. (2002:321) go so far as to say that
‘(a) market-friendly land reform of East
Asian magnitude is a non-starter’. They
conclude ‘a major redistributive land
reform is impossible if land transfers are
based on free market prices’.
Leading examples of countries that
have tried the market-based approach are
Brazil, Colombia, and South Africa (World
Bank 2003:147–50; Borras 2003:377).4 In
all these cases a number of key problems
have emerged. The programmes have not
delivered at the scale and speed expected,
they have not managed to involve the very
poor, nor have they reached the most
capable beneficiaries. Land purchases
have not been cheaper than with state-led
programmes; procedures have been
complicated, slow and costly; much land
acquired has been marginal; and private
sector loan financing has generally not
materialised (El-Ghonemy 1999:117–9).
In fact it appears that the only real success
has been the welcoming of the programme
by the current landowners (Borras 2003:
377–90). The anticipated decentralisation
of land reform implementation has not
happened systematically and, where it has
occurred, it has not brought the anticipated
benefits of accountability and transparency
as local elites have been able to influence
local institutions and reform programmes
(Borras 2003:389–90).
The benefits of de-concentrating
landholding are questioned by some who
argue that small farmers cannot benefit
from economies of scale, which even
proponents of de-concentration such as
Griffin et al. (2002:317–8) acknowledge
may be required under some circumstan-
ces. There is no doubt that, where expen-
sive machinery and other infrastructure
investment is required and is not divisible,
there are advantages to larger scale opera-
tions. Larger scale operations are also
normally more able to access capital at
lower costs (Van Zyl 1996:261–3). The
labour-intensive nature of production on
small farms is often seen as an advantage,
but the downside is that small farms have
lower levels of capitalisation and lower
labour productivity compared to large
farms (Griffin et al. 2002; Van Zyl 1996).
Central to the argument of the benefits
of the family-farm model and the poverty-
reducing effects of agricultural growth is
an assumption that there is available
under-utilised labour. This assumption is
questionable given that rural people, in
particular women, have a range of impor-
tant tasks and obligations in the home and
community. The multiple livelihood
strategies adopted by the poor for survival
are also leaving many in rural areas ‘too
busy to farm’ (Bernstein 2002:454). Even
where labour is under-utilised for much of
the year, it may still be inadequate to meet
production demands at key points such as
during harvesting.
The growing scourge of HIV/Aids,
especially in many parts of Africa inclu-
9
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ding rural South Africa, raises further
questions about the availability of labour.
Studies are increasingly showing a nega-
tive impact on productivity in agriculture
due to HIV/Aids. A study in Kenya found
that the labour-intensive agricultural sector
suffered most from the impact of HIV/
Aids, compared to other sectors (Topouzis
2000:24). A study in Tanzania found that
women spend 45% less time in agriculture
if their husbands are sick (Guinness &
Alban 2000:5). Agricultural outputs have
dropped dramatically in Aids-affected
households in Zimbabwe, with a 61% fall
in maize production (Guinness & Alban
2000:8). The effects of HIV/Aids may well
neutralise the prospects for growth in
agriculture and wipe out the benefits,
perhaps even the viability, of the small-
scale owner-operated farm model.
Land reform in South Africa
As negotiations to end apartheid pro-
ceeded in earnest in the early 1990s, those
aspiring to lead the country after liberation
faced a crisis of slow economic growth,
high inflation, mounting government
debts, growing poverty and massive
inequalities in wealth (Thompson 1995:
261). In this context it would be necessary
to meet the redistributive demands of those
in the liberation struggle and the poor in
general, while not provoking a right wing
back lash, and avoiding the flight of
capital and skills from the country.
The World Bank, along with allied
academics, had started to engage in policy
debates in South Africa from 1990, and
they appear to have had a strong influence
on policy development with their
proposals for a market-based land reform
model (Williams 1996). These proposals
were well captured in the book Agricul-
tural land reform in South Africa edited by
academics from the University of Pretoria
and the World Bank. The influence of
some of these academics has continued
with their involvement in the drafting of
the Land Redistribution for Agricultural
Development policy document released in
2001 and the Strategic Plan for South
African Agriculture released in 2002.5
Other inputs to the policy discussions
came from local academics and land activists
through local research and community
consultation processes (Williams 1996). A
national research project co-ordinated by
the Land and Agriculture Policy Centre
(LAPC)6 included community-level
research and consultation and attempted
to find ways of delivering land that
responded to a demand for land that was
informed by social needs, not just market
forces (Marcus et al. 1996:1). The assum-
ption at the time was that government was
committed to a land reform that would
target the ‘poorest of the poor’ (Marcus et
al. 1996:13).
The land reform policies of South
Africa’s first non-racial democratic
government begin with the Constitution
and the Reconstruction and Development
Programme. The RDP document, which
became the election manifesto of the ANC
in its 1994 election campaign, was drawn
up by activists from the liberation move-
ment, but clearly showed some of the
influence of the World Bank and other
advisors. It was also heavily influenced by
the compromises that were being negoti-
ated in order to facilitate the relatively
peaceful change of regime in South Africa.
Demands that had been part of the politics
of liberation movements, such as the call
of the 1955 Freedom Charter that the land
should belong to those who work it, were
not given expression in the RDP.
Section 25 of the Constitution deals
with property and land rights. Existing
property rights are protected under Section
25(1) while Section 25(2) allows for ex-
propriation only in terms of a law of
general application ‘for a public purpose
or in the public interest’ with ‘just and
equitable’ compensation (Section 25(3)).7
However, Section 25(4) goes on to say ‘the
public interest includes the nation’s
commitment to land reform’. Sub-sections
25(5), (6) and (7) require the state to take
legislative and other measures to ensure
land reforms. Thus the Constitution, while
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placing some constraints on the methods
that could be used, mandates land reform,
allows for expropriation, and allows
compensation at less than full market value
(Lahiff & Rugege 2002).
The 1997 White Paper on South African
Land Policy sets out a wide range of
objectives ranging from dealing with the
injustices of racially-based land dispos-
session, to promoting economic growth
and providing ‘secure tenure for all’ (DLA
1997:7). The White Paper also states that
the vision is ‘of a land policy and land
reform programme that contributes to
reconciliation, stability, growth and deve-
lopment in an equitable and sustainable
way’ (DLA 1997:7). The programme
elaborated in the White Paper comprises
redistribution, tenure reform and restitution
programmes, as required by sub-sections
25(5), 25(6) and 25(7) of the Constitution
respectively.
Restitution sets up a legal and ad-
ministrative process, governed by the
Restitution of Land Rights Act (Act 22 of
1994), to restore rights in land to people
who can prove that they were dispossessed
of such rights after 19 June 1913 due to
racist laws or policies of former govern-
ments. The restitution process does not aim
to meet any target for redistribution of
land, and successful land claims can be
settled with the return of land, alternative
land, payment of cash or another form of
compensation (DLA 1997:52–7). Land
claims settled so far have not contributed
significantly to unravelling apartheid
spatial planning – the majority of claims
have been settled through financial
compensation, not the return of land (Hall
2003:26, 35).
Tenure reform has two distinct aspects
to it, one dealing with improving the
security of tenure for those living on other
people’s land, primarily farm dwellers on
commercial farms, and the other aimed at
providing legally secure tenure for people
living on communal land, primarily in the
former bantustans. A number of new laws
have sought to give at least procedural
rights to black farm dwellers, but have
done little to give people their own land or
long-term security of tenure. The process
of developing legislation to deal with
tenure in communal areas dragged on for
years with little progress until the Commu-
nal Land Rights Bill was gazetted in
August 2002 (Government Gazette no.
23740) and later re-gazetted in October
2003 (Government Gazette no. 25562).
The Bill came in for heavy criticism from
land activists and academics, but never-
theless it was passed by Parliament in
February. The Communal Land Rights Act
(Act 11 of 2004) was signed into law by
the President on 14 July 2004. It will come
into effect on a date still to be decided
(Claassens 2003; Cousins & Claassens
2003; Sparks 2004).
Post-1994 redistribution
The RDP saw land reform as ‘the central
and driving force of a programme of rural
development’ and set a specific target of
redistributing 30% of agricultural land
within five years (ANC 1994:21–3). This
target was first proposed in the 1993 World
Bank document Options for land reform
and rural restructuring in South Africa
(Williams 1996:139–40). The RDP
suggested a range of measures for
redistributing land, including a land tax to
free up land, ‘substantial funding’,
expropriation of land, and provision of
support services to ensure effective land
use (ANC 1994:21). The RDP also
suggested other measures that fell outside
the main thrust of market-based land
reform policies, but it did not map out a
path for economic restructuring that would
have been supportive of radical land
reform. Statements in the RDP that clearly
fell outside a neo-liberal economic
approach, such as ‘increasing the public
sector in strategic areas through, for
example, nationalisation’, (ANC 1994:80)
quickly disappeared from subsequent
policies.
The White Paper on South African Land
Policy sets out a clearly market-based
approach to land redistribution: it is to be
demand-led, with a limited role for the state:
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Redistributive land reform will be
largely based on willing-buyer willing-
seller arrangements. Government will
assist in the purchase of land but will
in general not be the buyer or owner.
Rather it will make land acquisition
grants available (DLA 1997:38).
The White Paper suggests co-operation
with the private sector and NGOs, inter-
departmental co-ordination, capacity
building at community level, and regular
monitoring and evaluation (DLA 1997:95)
The first redistribution programme was
structured around the Settlement/Land
Acquisition Grant provided by the govern-
ment to assist families with an income of
less than R1 5008 per month with land
purchases. The poor were clearly the target
group and poverty alleviation was a main
objective. Further innovations allowed for
communal or group ownership and muni-
cipal commonage under the ownership and
control of local government (DLA 1997).
A review of the SLAG policy conducted
by DLA from 1998 to 1999 identified a
range of weaknesses in implementation
and with the quality of the group projects
created. A new Minister for Agriculture
and Land Affairs was appointed in June
1999 and she immediately called for
changes to the redistribution policies and
placed a moratorium on new SLAG
projects (Lahiff 2001:4). In February 2000
the Minister released a policy statement
confirming weaknesses of the SLAG
approach including the failure to realise
land reform objectives, the reliance on
market forces for redistribution failing to
produce the desired results, and the SLAG
grants being unsuitable for the creation of
a group of black commercial farmers
(DLA 2000b:2). The policy statement
outlined the new approach to redistribution
and was followed shortly thereafter with
the release of the first draft9 of the Land
Redistribution for Agricultural Develop-
ment programme, which was to become the
primary mechanism for land redistribution.
DLA immediately started dealing with
redistribution in terms of LRAD, although
the policy was only finalised in April 2001
and officially launched in August 2001
with the handover of title deeds at
Nkomazi in Mpumalanga (DLA 2002:
55–9).
LRAD is a more explicitly market-
friendly approach, closer in design to the
suggestions of the World Bank (which was
closely involved in its drafting) and other
proponents of market-based land reforms
than the SLAG programme had been
(Lahiff 2001:5). This follows a broader
shift in the post-liberation government’s
economic policies that took on a more
market- and investor-friendly direction
with the adoption of Gear, the Growth
Employment and Redistribution macro-
economic policy, in 1996.
The LRAD programme has replaced an
income ceiling under SLAG with an entry
floor, requiring all beneficiaries to make
their own contribution to projects (see
Chapter 5 for details). It also puts more
emphasis on ensuring an economic benefit
from land redistribution and the promotion
of a black commercial farming sector
(Lahiff 2001:4–5). At the same time
LRAD, like SLAG, has stated objectives of
improving the nutrition status and incomes
of the poor and addressing the legacy of
inequitable landholding in South Africa
(DLA 2001).
Alongside the land reform programme
there has been a dramatic liberalisation of
the agricultural sector more broadly. This
has been in line with market-based
prescriptions of smaller state involvement,
less regulation, the encouragement of ‘free
trade’, and the removal of the ‘distortions’
that had been a central part of the South
African agricultural economy for decades
(Binswanger & Deininger 1996:92–3;
Williams 1996:148; World Bank 2003:
151). During the 1980s the govern-ment
provided more than R4 billion in direct
financial assistance and subsidies to about
27 000 white farmers (Kirsten & Van Zyl
1996:231). Government subsidies of wheat
and maize alone amounted to over R500
million in 1988. In addition to direct
financial subsidisation, the government
maintained a high level of tariff protection
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for agriculture in South Africa. By the end
of the 1990s all direct financial assistance,
subsidies, and other protections had been
removed, leaving the South African agri-
cultural sector as one of the least protected
in the world (Tilley 2002:4).
Critics argue that, far from creating a
level playing field, the liberalisation of the
agricultural sector will enhance the domi-
nance of those already holding economic
power and further alienate potential new
entrants into the sector. Increasingly the
producers’ share of food prices, profits,
and control is dropping as the large com-
panies which control the off-farm activities
have more and more power in the sector.
The ‘(p)romotion of competition requires a
restructuring of the dominant firms in the
processing, wholesaling and retailing of
food, tobacco and alcohol’ (Williams 1996:
135). Without such restructuring there will
be a renewed ‘regulation’, imposed by the
dominant firms, which will further disad-
vantage small black farmers (Williams
1996:154). With no tariff protection and
competition from subsidised agriculture in
Europe and North America, it is hard for
many large established farms with accu-
mulated equity to survive. For new farmers
with little equity it will be even more
difficult to compete.
Land activists and some academics
have questioned whether a market-based
land reform programme, in particular the
reliance on the willing-seller model, can
bring about the fundamental shift in pro-
perty rights required, given the history and
the extreme inequality in landholding that
prevails in South Africa. Some have
argued for a more interventionist and
robust approach from the state to ensure a
fundamental transformation of landholding
(NLC 2003; Lahiff 2003; Greenberg
2003). The lack of delivery was confirmed
by implementation statistics which showed
that less than 1% of agricultural land had
been redistributed between 1994 and
2000. The government response, which
has been to move away from a pro-poor
focus to a more clearly commercial farmer-
oriented programme in the form of LRAD,
has raised new concerns. Primary amongst
these is the criticism that it will only be:
those who are already in positions of
power in communities who will be
heard and who will have the
wherewithal to exercise their rights,
while those who are currently
voiceless and marginalized will be
shunted further to the peripheries of
access and development (Tilley
2002:41).
Other specific concerns raised about
LRAD are the lack of any mechanism to
ensure that women benefit, the willing-
seller approach that will allow current land
owners to continue dictating the availa-
bility of land, the lack of any specific role
for local government, and the failure to
make clear links with other legs of the land
reform programme and rural development
more broadly (Lahiff 2001).
Despite the sometimes heated debates
on the merits of LRAD, there has been
almost no empirical research to assess the
actual impact of the programme. Hopefully
this report will contribute to filling that
gap.
Endnotes
1. The most commonly referred-to success stories for
redistributive land reform in the 20th century are
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and China (Griffin et al.
2002:302–10; Binswanger & Deininger 1996:74;
Prosterman & Riedinger 1987; Wilson & Ramphele
1989:315; World Bank 2003:xxxix, 144).
2. What is referred to here as ‘market-based land
reform’ includes what is also referred to as ‘market-
led agrarian reform’ (Borras 2003), ‘market-assisted
agrarian reform’ (Tilley 2002), or ‘market-friendly
land reform’ (Bernstein 2002; Griffin et al. 2002).
3. The production value of the land is equivalent to the
loan that any person using the land effectively could
afford to repay from production on the land. This is
sometimes referred to as the ‘capitalised value of
agricultural profits’. The reasons given to explain the
difference between the market and the capitalised
value of the land are factors such as the collateral
value of land for securing access to credit, subsidies
for large farmers, income tax exemptions, and the
use of land for speculation (Binswanger & Deininger
1996:70).
4. The critiques by Borras and the World Bank of the
South African land redistribution experience are
based on the Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant
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process that was replaced in 2001 by the LRAD
programme.
5. The Strategic Plan for South African Agriculture was
drawn up primarily by two farmers’ unions, Agri-SA
and the National African Farmers’ Union (NAFU), in
response to a request from President Thabo Mbeki.
Professor Kirsten produced the drafts and the United
States Agency for International Development
(USAID) funded the process (NDA 2002:3).
6. LAPC was set up in 1993 to assist in policy
development, on the initiative of the Land Desk
within the ANC that was headed by Derek Hanekom
who became the first Minister of Land Affairs in the
first ANC government in 1994. The LAPC carried
out a range of studies including a 1994–95 national
study of demand for land that culminated in the book
Down to earth (Marcus et al. 1996).
7. According to section 25(3) of the Constitution there
are five factors to be considered when calculating
compensation that is just and equitable, namely the
current use of the property; the history of the
acquisition and use of the property; the market value
of the property; the extent of direct state investment
and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital
improvement of the property; and the purpose of the
expropriation.
8. At the time – 1996 – this was worth approximately
US$250.
9. The first draft of the policy was titled the Integrated
Programme for Land Redistribution and Agricultural
Development in South Africa.
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The data was gathered as a researchproject implemented by the NkuziDevelopment Association under the
management of the author.1 The author
was assisted in the data-gathering phase by
a team of three other Nkuzi staff.2 The core
of the study involved the administration of
questionnaires that were complemented by
field notes.
The scope of the study covered all 20
LRAD projects approved by DLA in
Limpopo up to the end of March 2003.
Information was obtained on all of these
projects, and direct interviews were carried
out with beneficiaries from 14 of them.
Information was also gathered from the
Land Bank on the LRAD projects that it
had approved in the province. However
difficulties in accessing information and
limited time and resources made a full
investigation of the Land Bank projects
impractical.
Most of the information was gathered
from November 2002 to April 2003. Some
follow up interviews were done with key
informants later in 2003 and early in 2004
to fill information gaps or clarify areas of
uncertainty that emerged during the
analysis of the data.
Key informants, primarily in DLA, but
also from the Limpopo Department of
Agriculture (DoA), the Land Bank and the
Human Sciences Research Council, were
interviewed using structured interviews
with open-ended questions. Additional
data such as reports and lists of projects
were provided by some of the key
informants.
Fourteen beneficiaries were interviewed
using two questionnaires, one that obtain-
ed mostly biographical information and the
other which focused on agricultural pro-
duction. Some points of interest that went
beyond the structure of the questionnaire
were explored further and noted. This
information was complemented by site
visits and supplementary interviews.
Endnotes
1. Nkuzi Development Association is a non-profit
organisation working on land and agrarian reform in
the Limpopo and Gauteng provinces of South Africa.
The author of this study was the Director of Nkuzi at
the time the research was carried out.
2. Mike Nefale, Ndiaphi Kwinda and Kgalema
Kalauba.
Chapter 3: Methodology
This study is a critical examination of the implementation of LRAD in
Limpopo up to 2003. The key questions addressed by the study are:
! What kinds of projects are being created by LRAD?
! Who is benefiting from LRAD?
! Is LRAD achieving its own objectives?
! To what extent is LRAD achieving what is expected of market-
based land reform?
! Can LRAD and market-based approaches to land reform achieve the
objectives of land reform in South Africa?
15
Limpopo is 123 600km
2 in size and
is bordered by Zimbabwe to the
north, Mozambique to the east,
Botswana to the west and the South
African provinces of Gauteng, Mpuma-
langa and North West in the south. It is the
fifth largest of South Africa’s nine provin-
ces and has the fourth largest population –
approximately 5.3 million people at the
time of the 2001 census. Around 2.4 mil-
lion of the population are male, and 2.9
million female. More than 97% are black
African, 0.2% coloured, 0.2% Indian or
Asian, and 2.4% white (Stats SA 2003).
Over two thirds of the land in Limpopo,
approximately 87 000km2, was allocated
Chapter 4: Background to
Limpopo
This chapter provides basic information on Limpopo province in order to
illustrate the context within which the LRAD programme is being
assessed.
Figure 2: Map of Limpopo
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for white ownership and use in the past,
primarily commercial agriculture with
some forestry and conservation. Farming
on this land was carried out on about
7 200 commercial farming units (Stats SA
1996). Meanwhile the former homelands
occupied 36 000km2, just under one third
of the land area, and accommodated ap-
proximately 299 000 small farmers as well
as the majority of the 5.1 million African
population (see Figure 1 on page 2).
Limpopo is arguably the poorest pro-
vince in South Africa and faces enormous
development challenges. It is the most
rural of any province in the country with
approximately 89% of the population
living in non-urban areas. Less than 10%
of the households have piped water in their
dwellings, 38% rely on public taps for their
water supply and 10.5% rely on dams,
rivers or springs. A total of 59.5% of
households use wood for cooking and
heating. Limpopo has an unemployment
rate of 48.8%, according to Statistics South
Africa figures, which count those actively
seeking work who could not find work at
the time of the survey. A closer analysis
shows that only 22.7% of the population
between the ages of 15 and 65 actually
have work (Stats SA 2003).
The agricultural sector is the largest
employer outside the public sector
employing 118 261 people. Only the
Western Cape has a larger number of farm
workers (Stats SA 2000). Many of these
people and their families live on the farms.
Others live on the farms, but no longer
work there. It is common in Limpopo for
families to have lived for generations on
one farm. In some cases people can trace
their occupation of the same land to times
before the first white settlers arrived.
Conditions on farms are typical of those
across the country with farm residents and
workers receiving extremely low wages
and suffering under notoriously poor
working conditions. A national study
carried out for the Department of Labour
(2001) found that ‘(c)hildren living on
commercial farms are more likely to be
stunted and underweight than any other
children’.1
Limpopo had three ‘homeland’ govern-
ments during the apartheid era: Lebowa,
Gazankulu and Venda. African people
were forced to live in these areas on the
basis of their ethnic origin. Forced
removals, for the purpose of consolidating
these homelands, are the basis of many
restitution claims. Overcrowding in these
areas resulted in soil erosion and the
development of rural slums, whose resi-
dents have little opportunity to enter paid
employment. This situation is compounded
by the large-scale exodus of men to the
industrialised centres such as Gauteng in
search of work (Wilson & Ramphele
1989:42). As a result, over 55% of the
province’s population is female. Children
and youth make up the largest proportion
of the population with 52.6% of the
population under the age of 20 (Stats SA
2003).
Limpopo has varied geography, rainfall
and soil fertility. In the fertile areas
agriculture is an important source of
income. Here maize is the main crop, with
fruit, vegetables, tea and cereals grown
where possible. Cattle farming is practised
in the western and northern parts where the
rainfall is generally too low for cultivation
(Kirsten 1996:306–9).
The rural communities of Limpopo are
characterised by a low degree of self-
organisation, with weak and limited
relations between the traditional authorities
and the new local government structures
that were set up in 1995 and restructured
in 1999. Neither the traditional structures
nor the newly-established democratic local
government structures have engaged
actively with the land reform programme,
with one or two exceptions. These struc-
tures have not been effective in providing
communities with information on deve-
lopment programmes and reforms, with the
result that communities often do not know
how to access the (limited) support
available from the state (Nkuzi 2001).
Land reform in Limpopo has suffered
many of the same shortcomings as the
rest of South Africa. It was very slow to
get started and the projects that were
implemented under SLAG in the period
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1995–99 were often of very poor quality
with questionable viability. A study of land
reform in the then Northern Province at the
end of 1998 identified serious problems
with the nature of project identification,
ineffective land acquisition, and inap-
propriate project planning (Lahiff 1998).2
By mid-1998, four years into the
democratic dispensation, only three land
redistribution projects had been imple-
mented in the province, a number which
rose to seven by the end of 1998 (Lahiff
1998). These redistribution projects were
all on private land and appeared to be
largely initiated by the landowners. This
contributed to inappropriate project design
and poor group dynamics as groups of
people were put together to ‘fit’ the land
rather than land being found to fit the
needs of an existing group. The tailoring
of groups to the land was done in order to
combine the grants of R15 000 (later
increased to R16 000) per family into a
total grant amount sufficient for the pur-
chase of the land. Unfortunately this
process of combining grants was done
with little consideration of other inves-
tments required for the farms to become
productive.
The state proved to be a very poor
buyer of land with the long delays and
uncertainties leading current owners who
had been willing to sell to withdraw from
deals. Lahiff recommended that either
improvements be made to make the state a
more effective agent for purchasing land
on the open market, or a policy shift be
undertaken away from the willing seller-
willing buyer approach (Lahiff 1998). The
project planning was found to be largely
inappropriate, involving little consultation
with beneficiaries and no consideration of
the current skills and experience of bene-
ficiaries. There was also a strong emphasis
on commercial farming, regardless of the
interests and abilities of the beneficiaries,
and no programme for building capacity
amongst beneficiaries and their structures
(Lahiff 1998).
By the time the LRAD policy had
been completed in 2001 there had been a
considerable increase in SLAG delivery in
terms of the numbers of hectares trans-
ferred and beneficiaries. At the beginning
of this study early in 2003, DLA reported
that 77 SLAG projects had been implemen-
ted for 6 753 households which gained
access to a total land area of 45 110ha.
However according to DLA officials, the
organisational and production problems
with the projects created remained as
severe as before (interview 3).
Endnotes
1. For more details refer to page 25 of Part 1,
Livelihoods of farm workers in South African
agriculture (Department of Labour 2001).
2. The name of the province changed in 2002.
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Aims and objectives
According to DLA policydocuments the objectives ofLRAD, which are to be achieved
in the 15 years from 2000, are to:
! increase access to agricultural
land by black people (Africans,
Coloureds and Indians) and to
contribute to the redistribution of
approximately 30% of the
country’s commercial agricultural
land (i.e. formerly ‘white
commercial farmland’) over the
duration of the programme
! contribute to relieving the
congestion in over-crowded
former homeland areas
! improve nutrition and incomes of
the rural poor who want to farm
on any scale
! overcome the legacy of past
racial and gender discrimination
in ownership of farmland
! facilitate structural change over
the long term by assisting black
people who want to establish
small and medium-sized farms
! stimulate growth from agriculture
! create stronger linkages between
farm and off-farm income
generating activities
! expand opportunities for
promising young people who stay
in rural areas
! empower beneficiaries to improve
their economic and social well-
being
! enable those presently accessing
agricultural land in communal
areas to make better productive
use of their land
! promote environmental
sustainability of land and other
natural resources
(DLA 2001:6).
Most of these objectives are vague and
have no quantitative or qualitative
component that could be effectively
monitored. The target of redistributing
‘approximately 30%’ of commercial
agricultural land may sound reasonably
clear on first reading, but it is not ex-
plained anywhere how much of this 30%
LRAD is expected to ‘contribute’. In
addition, exactly which land is not clear as
the previous section of the LRAD policy
document refers to 30% of ‘all agricultural
land’ while the objectives section refers to
30% of formerly ‘white commercial
farmland’. There is a distinct difference
between these two types of land. This lack
of clarity on the targeted amount of land
combined with the long list of various
types of objectives does not help give a
clear focus and purpose to the programme.
The nature of the objectives also makes it
This chapter provides an overview of the LRAD policy and its
implementation in Limpopo, based on official policy documents and
reports and elaborated by implementation officials. It explains the aims
and objectives of the programme, the services provided to beneficiaries
through LRAD and the implementation structures and procedures in
Limpopo. It also analyses some of the data available on progress to date,
and outlines perceptions of progress and challenge held by the
government officials responsible for LRAD implementation.
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difficult to hold government accountable
for delivery.
The uncertainty about the target for
land redistribution is shared by Limpopo
implementation officials. The provincial
DLA officials we interviewed believed the
target for LRAD is to redistribute 30% of
land in 15 years to ‘black, Indian and
coloured’ citizens who are at least 18 years
of age. However they were not clear about
whether the 30% refers to all land, or only
agricultural land (interviews 1, 2 and 3).
The provincial DoA official interviewed
noted that LRAD is not the only land
reform programme; implying that 30% is
a target for all forms of land reform, in-
cluding restitution (interview 4). DLA staff
have not done any calculation to establish
what the 30% target would mean in terms
of hectares of land to be delivered in
Limpopo, or any estimate of how much
land they would need to deliver every year
to reach the target, or what any of this
would cost.
According to the LRAD policy docu-
ment (DLA 2001:10) the programme is
intended to assist people to acquire or
lease land for agricultural purposes ran-
ging ‘from subsistence to medium-scale
commercial’ operations. However the
officials we interviewed felt that land
acquired through LRAD is not for sub-
sistence, it is strictly for commercial
agricultural purposes.
LRAD beneficiaries must be adults who
were previously disadvantaged in terms of
race and who want to use the land for
agricultural production regardless of
whether they are rich or poor, although
civil servants are excluded. The LRAD
policy document also gives particular
attention to addressing gender imbalances
in access to land. In this area LRAD sets a
very clear target: ‘not less than one third of
the transferred land resources must accrue
to women’ (DLA 2001:7). The officials
interviewed also emphasised that the
policy requires the targeting of women and
youth (DLA 2001:6–7).
LRAD, as the primary means of
redistributing land, is also expected to
contribute to the overall objectives
contained in the White Paper:
to address the injustices of
apartheid; to foster national
reconciliation and stability; to
underpin economic growth; and to
improve household welfare and
alleviate poverty (DLA 1997:v).
When assessing the LRAD programme, its
contribution to the achievement of these
broader objectives should also be
considered.
LRAD services and support
The primary mechanism of LRAD is
grants to beneficiaries. The size of a
grant depends on the applicant’s own
contribution, skills and management
ability, although in practice there is no
systematic assessment of management
ability (DLA 2001:7; NDA 2001:5). To
receive a R20 000 grant a person must
contribute R5 000. The more a potential
beneficiary can contribute, the larger the
grant he or she qualifies for, up to a
maximum of R100 000, for which an own
contribution of R400 000 would have be
made (DLA 2001:8–9). The own con-
tribution may be in the form of the bene-
ficiary’s own labour up to a maximum
value of R5 000. Contributions may also
be made in the form of cash, assets or
loans. All of these may be combined to
make up the full value of the contribution
(DLA 2001; NDA 2001). Those applying
as a group have to register a legal entity to
own the land and may combine their
grants in order to muster sufficient finance
for the purchase of the targeted land (NDA
2001:3). DLA also assists beneficiaries to
access loans from the state-owned Land
Bank in order to make up any shortfall for
land purchase.
The LRAD policy makes provision for
beneficiaries to ‘graduate from smaller to
larger farms’ through receiving further
grants, as long as the total amount of
grants received by one person never
exceeds the R100 000 maximum. This
facility is intended to enable farmers, who
initially do not have the skills and
Chapter 5: The LRAD programme
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experience for larger projects, to expand
their operations once they have established
themselves (DLA 2001:10; NDA 2001:6).
This opportunity for ‘graduation’ has not
yet been implemented in any case in
Limpopo.
LRAD grant money is never given
to the beneficiary, it is paid directly to the
seller of the land or other assets being
purchased. While there should be consul-
tation with the beneficiary, the final de-
cision on the release of the grant money
and the payment is made by DLA.
Land targeted for redistribution through
LRAD is to be purchased from willing
sellers. Officials from the various depart-
ments of agriculture and DLA ‘as well as
potentially officials from other government
departments’ are expected to play a facili-
tative role in making applicants aware of
land that is available on the market (DLA
2001:7). DLA organises the valuation of the
land and normally pays the seller a market-
related price as determined by a valuer.
A ‘planning grant’ is available in
addition to the main LRAD grant to pay
for ‘design agents’ to work on the project
design, business plans and proposals. The
planning grant is also used to pay for
services such as land valuations and land
sub-division. The planning grant should
not exceed 15% of the projected total
capital costs of the project (DLA 2001:10).
The DLA team working on LRAD
implementation in Limpopo in the first
quarter of 2003 comprised approximately
23 staff: 18–19 planners, plus deputy
directors, and the Director. The provincial
DoA claims it can draw on almost all its
staff to assist with LRAD, including crop
scientists, horticulturalists, animal scien-
tists, and people with expertise in business
planning (interview 4).
According to officials, additional
support offered by DLA in Limpopo
includes the drafting of business plans,
arranging training, making contributions
towards the cost of training, assistance in
marketing of produce, and arranging other
support from the DoA (interviews 1,  2 and
3). The relevant provincial DoA is expec-
ted to provide training, agricultural support
services and technical opinions on the
proposed farm plans (DLA 2001). The
DoA provides assistance with business
planning, development and aftercare sup-
port, implementation, and provisions of
technical assistance. It emerged from the
beneficiary interviews, and this was
confirmed by some of the officials, that
most LRAD projects are not yet receiving
support and the DLA ‘is still arranging to
service them’ (interview 1).
LRAD structures and
procedures
The national departments of Agriculture
and Land Affairs are responsible for
overall design and monitoring of LRAD
implementation. The national DLA
budgets for the provision of LRAD grants,
while the provincial DoA is expected to
budget for the post-settlement support
work. The DLA Provincial Director is the
responsible accounting officer for pur-
poses of authorising the release of grants,
but he or she is expected to work with the
Provincial Grant Committee (PGC) that
must first approve all projects (DLA 2001).
The PGC is made up of officials from the
departments of Agriculture, Land Affairs,
Public Works, and Local Government and
Housing (interview 1).1 The PGC in
Limpopo is chaired by the Director for
Farmer Settlement in the provincial DoA
(interview 32).
DLA allocated an amount of LRAD
money to the Land Bank for it to
implement LRAD projects nationally.
In the projects it implemented, the bank
arranged the loan component, the LRAD
grant, and the appointment of design
agents or other required service providers.
The Land Bank substantially overspent its
LRAD budget so from the end of the
2002–03 financial year, DLA withdrew
this mandate (interview 34). However
there is still a role for the Land Bank as it
provides loans for beneficiaries of DLA-
implemented LRAD projects and can assist
its clients to make applications for LRAD
grants through the normal procedures.
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According to the policy (DLA 2001; NDA
2001) the process of accessing LRAD
grants starts with beneficiaries who may
apply as individuals or as a group. Bene-
ficiaries are expected to decide on the size
of grant they would like, identify land,
develop a business plan, show proof of
their own investment in the project, and
submit all of this to the PGC. A project also
has to have the endorsement of the local
DoA office regarding the feasibility of the
plan and a confirmation from a profession-
al valuer that the land price is reasonable.
The beneficiaries may choose to ask a
design agent to assist them in any of the
tasks or they may prepare the proposal
themselves. On seeing that an applicant
needs assistance, DLA may also appoint
design agents and valuers to assist, and
such costs may be paid from the planning
grant. Once approved, DLA appoints a
conveyancer, organises any subdivision of
land that may be required, and releases the
money. The relevant DoA should then
appoint a ‘mentor/extension officer’ to
provide support and organise training for
the project (NDA 2001:4).
According to the officials we
interviewed, projects are allocated to a
specific district project officer who refers
the application to the PGC when it is ready.
Applicants are assisted to check that the
application forms are complete. If appli-
cants have not identified a particular farm
for the project, they are assisted to do so.
DLA checks with the Regional Land Claims
Commission (RLCC) to ensure the targeted
land is not subject to a land claim. Appli-
cants are interviewed to make sure they
know what they are embarking on and to
inform them about how LRAD and the
application process works. Project officers
continue interacting with applicants until
they have all the information needed to
process the application.
When reviewing a project application
the PGC may approve the application,
reject the application, or return it to the
applicant for further information (DLA
2001:11). Some potential reasons that
officials gave for rejecting applications
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were that the land is not suitable or of
sufficient size for the intended use, the
land is overpriced, or the applicant has
already received other land-related grants
(interviews 1, 2 and 3). Alternatives for
those whose applications have been
rejected include applying for access to
municipal commonage or the lease of a
government farm. At the time of writing,
no municipal commonage projects had
been implemented in Limpopo (interviews
1 and 3). Another approach is for the DLA
project officer to adjust the proposal to try
and make the project more viable. One
option is to arrange a Land Bank loan to
ensure sufficient investment for the project
to succeed. However there was concern
that this could lead to the Land Bank
repossessing land if beneficiaries failed to
repay their loans (interview 2).
While there is a clear target for the
extent to which women should access
land, there is little indication in the policy
documents as to the measures that should
be used to ensure this takes place. The
policy document, apart from recommen-
ding the encouragement of women-only
projects, simply highlights basic principles
such as pointing out that ‘women can
apply for grants to acquire land indivi-
dually’ and officials ‘must ensure that
women are able to participate on an equal
footing with men’ in the implementation of
LRAD (DLA 2001:6–7). According to the
officials we interviewed, women who do
participate are treated the same as men and
become landowners in their own names, as
opposed to the situation in communal
areas and in some of the earlier SLAG
projects where land is often registered in
the name of a male household head. It was
acknowledged that the DoA does not have
any specific programme to involve women
(interview 4). DLA officials try to promote
women’s participation through specifically
encouraging them to apply, explaining that
women are meant to benefit from the
programme, and dividing men from
women in meetings to give women an
opportunity to talk without men being
present (interviews 1, 2 and 3).
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Achievements of LRAD
From LRAD’s inception in 2000 until the
end of December 2002, 504 projects had
been implemented, redistributing 267 680ha
of land. Of this total, 415 were implemen-
ted by DLA, involving the redistribution of
208 564ha of land (Jacobs et al. 2003). By
March 2003 the Limpopo PGC had appro-
ved a total of 49 LRAD projects affecting
22 291.81ha of land for 326 beneficiaries.
Of these 20 were implemented by DLA
and the remainder by the Land Bank. The
20 DLA-implemented projects involved
the transfer of 14 147ha to 251 people.
The total grant money approved for these
20 projects was R5 977 307.
Of the 20 DLA projects 18 are for
individual beneficiaries and two are group
projects, one with 203 and the other with
30 beneficiaries. Of the 18 individual
beneficiaries only one was a woman. The
average grant amount received by men
was just over 25% higher than that
received by women and the average loan
amount received by men was more than 12
times higher than that received by women.
Overall women will access only 17.9% of
the land, just over half the targeted one-
third (33.3%). Only 11 of the individual
beneficiaries received loans. These 11
beneficiaries also had higher amounts of
their own assets invested in the projects
than any of the others. The loans referred
to were obtained from the Land Bank.
DLA has no information available on any
loans that beneficiaries may have obtained
from private sector sources.
According to figures provided by DLA,
the individual beneficiaries invested assets
of their own ranging in value from
R20 000 to R821 236, with an average
asset value of R173 158 per person. The
own contribution from the group projects
was only in the form of labour and was
valued at the amount of R5 000 per person
(Makharamedzha 2002). There is no
specific information available on the
income of the beneficiaries nor does DLA
appear to have any mechanism in place to
gather such information, but the assets put
into the projects by the 18 individual
beneficiaries indicate that they are fairly
wealthy.
Only eight of the 251 beneficiaries are
youths (under 35 years old) and they all
belong to one of the group projects. The
fact that almost all the women belong to
groups indicates the important role that
group projects will play in benefiting
marginalised sectors of the society.
The average figures calculated from this
information give a misleading impression
of the projects (Table 1). When looking
more closely at the figures one sees that
there are really two distinctly different
types of projects being implemented, one
for relatively wealthy individuals, and the
other for poorer groups (Table 2).
While the vast majority of the benefi-
ciaries (92.8%) are part of groups, the bulk
of the land acquired (86.4%) has gone to
only 18 individuals. Averaging the figures
as is done in Table 1 above creates a
picture of a well-balanced programme,
with roughly half of all beneficiaries being
women, and beneficiaries acquiring 50 to
60 hectares of land each. The reality, as
revealed in Table 2, is of a two-tier
programme where the group beneficiaries
get around 8ha of land each, while a small
Table 1: Summary of LRAD projects implemented in Limpopo
Number of Hectares Average Grants Average Land Bank Average
beneficiaries hectares per (R) grant per loans (R) loan per
person person (R)  person (R)
Total 251 14 147 56.4 5 977 307 23 814 4 623 251 18 419
Men 127 11 617 91.4 3 417 307 26 908 4 268 251 33 608
Women 124 2 530 20.4 2 560 000 20 645 355 000 2 863
Source: DLA Provincial Office (Makharamedzha 2002).
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number of individuals are assisted to
acquire portions of land averaging close
to 700ha per person. The smallest portion
obtained by one of the individual benefi-
ciaries was 159ha and the largest 1 710ha.
Thus even the smallest portion obtained by
an individual is almost 20 times the size of
the average obtained by the group mem-
bers. It is quite clear that one reason for
this dramatic difference is the sizeable
assets of the individual beneficiaries that
enable them to access larger LRAD grants,
combined with their ability to access loan
finance.
Analysing the total projects costs and
the hectares of land obtained makes it clear
that the individual beneficiaries are getting
far more land for their money (see Table 3)
than the beneficiaries in the group projects.
Not only did the small group of individual
beneficiaries start with access to conside-
rable assets and finance, but the LRAD
programme gave them grants that were on
average nearly four times as large as those
received by poorer group members. Indivi-
dual beneficiaries are further favoured
over beneficiaries in groups through being
assisted to acquire more than four times as
much land per rand of project costs.
There is no information available on the
land cost in the largest group project as the
land was donated (see information on the
Table 2: Comparison of group and individual LRAD projects
Number of Hectares Average Grants Average Average of Average
beneficiaries hectares per (R) grant per own assets loan per
person person (R) put in per  person (R)
person (R)
Total 18 12 226 679.22 1 317 307 73 184 163 538 256 847
individual
Total 233 1 921 8.24 4 660 000 20 000 0 0
group
Individual 17 10 598 623.41 1 217 307 71 606 169 040 252 250
men
Men in 110 1 019 9.26 2 200 000 20 000 0 0
group
Individual 1 1 628 1 628.00 100 000 100 000 70 000 335 000
women
Women 123 902 7.33 2 460 000 20 000 0 0
in group
Source: Makharamedzha 2002.
Table 3: Comparison of average cost per hectare of land for individual and group beneficiaries
Total hectares Total own contribution* Average per hectare
plus grant  project cost
Total 14 147 14 834 244 1 048.58
Individuals 12 226 9 009 244 736.89
Groups 1 921 5 825 000 3 032.27
* Own contribution includes cash, loan component, assets in the project and labour (normally calculated
at R5 000 per person to enable people without other assets to access the minimum grant).
Source: Makharamedzha 2002.
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Vaalkop project in Chapter 6). Land prices
for the rest of the projects reveal that in the
other group project, Mankweng Integrated
(see Chapter 6), the land price was
R11 666 per hectare while the individual
beneficiaries got their land at an average
price of just R269 per hectare. Differences
in land prices could be explained by
objective factors such as the difference in
land quality and assets on the land, but
administrative practices also appear to
have been a factor.
Making direct contact with the
beneficiaries quickly revealed at least part
of the reason for some of the differences in
land prices noted above. Seventeen of the
18 individual projects approved are on two
blocks of state owned land, at Steilloop,
where there are five beneficiaries, and at
Manamead, where there are 12. It emerged
that in both of these areas the beneficiaries
had already been leasing the land in
question before the initiation of the LRAD
project. The state land they were on was
priced at production value rather than at
market value, yielding substantially lower
prices per hectare than could have been
obtained for land on the open market. The
private land to be acquired for the
Mankweng Integrated group project was
valued at market rates. DLA information
on projects approved identifies four
categories of planning grant expenses:
business planning, valuation, legal entity,
and other (Table 4). The largest amount of
planning grant money reported as spent is
allocated to ‘other’, giving little idea what
it was actually used for (Makharamedzha
2002). According to one DLA official, the
planning grant money listed under ‘other’
may be a provision and not money
actually spent, as he did not know what it
had been spent on (interview 33). The
Agricultural Research Council (ARC)
carried out the business planning for most
of the projects free of charge; other
planning required was done by DLA
officials, so there was little expenditure on
business plans. The Land Bank was paid to
do the land valuations on all the state land.
In addition to the DLA projects, 29
projects implemented by the Land Bank in
Limpopo involved the transfer of 8 144.81
hectares to 125 beneficiaries (Table 5).
A comparison with DLA-implemented
LRAD projects shows that the DLA
reached twice as many beneficiaries with
less than two thirds of the grant money.
Not surprisingly the loan component of the
DLA-implemented projects is far smaller
Table 4: Expenditure of planning grants on LRAD projects (R)
Business plans Valuations Legal entity Other Total
28 000 62 323 16 850 448 759 555 932
Source: Makharamedzha 2002.
Table 5: Land Bank-implemented LRAD projects
Number of Hectares Average Grants Average Loans (R) Average
beneficiaries hectares per (R) grant per loan per
person person (R)  person (R)
Total 125 8 144.81 65.16 9 225 264 73 802 27 455 807 219 646
Men 92 6 960.92 75.66 6 373 293 69 275 16 581 692 180 236
Women 33 1 183.89 35.88 2 851 971 86 423 10 874 115 329 519
DLA-implemented LRAD projects (for comparison)
Total 251 14 147 56.4 5 977 307 23 814 4 623 251 18 419
Source: Land Bank, Polokwane Branch (Land Bank 2003).
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than that of the Land Bank-implemented
projects with the average beneficiary of
Land Bank projects acquiring almost 12
times the amount of debt. While spending
more money, the Land Bank has assisted
with the acquisition of a far smaller
amount of land than the DLA. This is
undoubtedly due to the type of projects
supported and the payment of market
value for land acquired by the Land Bank
compared to the low cost of the state land
that DLA acquired for some beneficiaries
at less than market rates.
It is interesting to note that in 8 out of
14 projects involving women the women
have the same surname as another male
project member, indicating that they may
be applying as part of a family (Land Bank
2003). While women end up with a far
lower average amount of hectares than
men, they get a higher average loan and
grant amount. This is due to the concen-
tration of women in a few high cost, low
hectare, projects; primarily one R24.2
million project discussed below. In total
women obtained only 14.5% of the total
land transferred. This is less than half the
33.3% promised in the LRAD policy
document.
The Development Focus poultry project
alone used R20 million of loans (almost
75% of all the loans issued by the Land
Bank), and R4.2 million of LRAD grant
money. It has 42 beneficiaries (18 women
and 24 men) who each received a loan of
over R470 000, on top of the maximum
grant of R100 000, to purchase less than
15 hectares of land per person (Land Bank
2003). The project involved the purchase
of a chicken farm that had been known as
Mike’s Chickens, about 20km north west
of Polokwane (interview 34). The details
have been provided here because the scale
of the project has given it a large influence
over the total and average figures for the
Land Bank implementation of LRAD in
Limpopo.
The Land Bank spent considerably
more than the DLA on planning grants,
especially for business planning. It spent
nothing on land valuations and little on
‘other’. It should be noted that consi-
derably more than half of all the planning
grant money (R650 000) spent by the
Land Bank went on the Development
Focus project (Land Bank 2003). At the
same time a number of projects had no
planning grant money spent on them at all.
The nature of the planning grant ex-
penditure raises questions about how and
when the Land Bank decided to spend
planning grant money. Land Bank officials
explained that some applicants came with
business plans already prepared so there
was no need to spend money on further
planning. Even if people were assisted in
drawing up the business plans the Land
Bank felt they could not pay retrospe-
ctively for a service provider who was
not appointed by the bank. If people have
no business plan the Land Bank goes
through a tender process to identify and
contract a service provider who it will pay
(interview 34).
State land
According to the Chairperson of the PGC,
a decision was taken by DLA and DoA to
dispose of state land through the LRAD
process. Current lessees would be given
the first option to purchase, at the pro-
ductive rather than market value of the
land, provided they qualified to be LRAD
beneficiaries (interview 32). There was no
advertising of the opportunity to acquire
the state land. The DoA identified the land
Chapter 5: The LRAD programme
Table 6: Expenditure of planning grants on Land Bank-organised LRAD projects
Business plans Valuations Legal entity Other Total
931 883 0 29 405 101 414 1 062 702
Source: Land Bank 2003.
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that was not under land claim, and the
current lessees were approached to
establish if they qualified for LRAD grants
and wanted to participate in the pro-
gramme. In all cases they qualified and
became LRAD beneficiaries for the
purpose of purchasing the land they were
leasing (interview 32).
The state land acquired by LRAD
beneficiaries in this manner is all adjacent
to former homeland areas. It was bought
by the apartheid regime and held by the
South African Development Trust (SADT)
for incorporation into those homelands.
The process of transferring the land into
the homelands was not done; instead it was
leased to farmers. The White Paper
identifies former SADT land as available
for redistribution and requires it, along
with other public land, to be used to
support ‘government’s macro economic,
human development and redistribution
goals’. It also calls for the establishment of
‘acceptable mechanisms for public
consultation on the use of state and public
land’ (DLA 1997:83–4). The LRAD policy
envisages that the programme could be
used for the disposal of agricultural
state land. It also calls for a public
announcement of intent to sell the state
land and suggests a three-month notice
period to give an opportunity for bene-
ficiaries to organise themselves to make
bids for the land (DLA 2001:12; NDA
2001:9).
The LRAD policy requires proposals to
include the ‘value of the land relative to
market prices’ and makes no mention of a
different approach for the valuation of
state land (DLA 2001:11). However the
decision taken for the LRAD programme
in Limpopo to value the state land at
production values is in line with the DLA
Handbook on property valuation. The
handbook states that the general policy is
‘to estimate fair market value’, but goes on
to say that where state land is to be
disposed of for redistribution projects ‘the
preferred valuation approach is to estimate
the productive value of the property’ (DLA
2000:2, 19).
Implementers’ perceptions
All the officials interviewed believed that
the implementation of LRAD was going
slowly in Limpopo, although one felt that
it was better than a number of other
provinces (interview 1). The main reasons
suggested for the slow pace of delivery
are the high prices being demanded by
landowners, the slow process of buying
land by the government with all the
information and stages of approval that
are required, and the amount of land under
restitution claims.
There were differing opinions on the
extent of involvement of women in
projects, and officials did not seem to have
access to, or were not aware of, any
figures showing how many women were
involved and how much land they had
obtained. Where women are involved in
decision making, officials remain con-
cerned that they often remain passive and
‘rubber stamp’ decisions. One reason
given for a lack of women’s involvement
was that ‘women want land close to where
they live’ (interview 4). Given the lack of
access to transport for most rural women
and judging by the long distances that
many beneficiaries have to travel to the
land acquired, this could be a significant
factor which is not considered in LRAD
project design (see Chapter 7). It was
commonly agreed that further efforts need
to be made to ensure that women get
actively involved and benefit from the
redistribution programme.
Estimates for the time taken to process
applications from the initial application to
project approval ranged from 2–6 months
(interview 1) and a minimum of six
months (interview 2). Factors identified as
causing delays were: delays in getting
valuation reports; farmers refusing to sell
or delaying the sales; the general delays
from government due to its protocols and
procedures (it was noted that the DLA is
revising the project cycle to try and
shorten it); and problems in the committees
dealing with project approvals, because
they were initially not sure how to handle
applications.
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The officials interviewed largely felt that
it was too early to say whether the projects
are sustainable or not, although they be-
lieve they could be, as long as the bene-
ficiaries are dedicated. Some difficulties
that they identify as negatively affecting
sustainability are: conflicts within group
projects; an over-dependency on DLA;
some beneficiaries knowing nothing about
farming; and others not being committed
to farming.
DLA had no information on the produ-
ctivity on the farms or of the improvement
in the lives of the beneficiaries. The offi-
cials interviewed seemed to believe that
the LRAD projects had improved people’s
lives, but did not have a sense of the extent
of this improvement or any data to support
their view. The main reason cited for a lack
of information was the newness of the
projects.
The officials interviewed identified
a number of key challenges for LRAD
implementation, ranging from the size of
the grant and attitudes of beneficiaries to
natural disasters such as droughts (see
Box 1). They are responding to these
challenges through providing training and
technical assistance, encouraging benefi-
ciaries to move from subsistence to
commercial farming, and trying to access
support from municipalities when there are
natural disasters. According to a respon-
dent, the Minister for Agriculture and Land
Affairs is speaking to farmers’ unions in
order to encourage them to release land for
the LRAD programme (interview 3). Offi-
cials would also like to see more subdivi-
sion of land, but say there are policies
blocking this.
Government officials also had a number
of recommendations for policy changes
that they believe would improve the
programme. They would like to see LRAD
used in communal areas where people
already have access to land, but do not
have the resources to fully utilise the land.
This is possible, according to the LRAD
policy document (DLA 2001:10), but has
not happened yet in Limpopo. Another
suggestion made was to ensure that more
of the beneficiaries are people with agri-
cultural and management skills, including
civil servants, so that they can share their
skills. It was also suggested that the grant
should be increased to keep pace with
increasing land prices and to allow people
to purchase larger farms in order to have a
better chance of making a reasonable
income. In particular the minimum grant of
Box 1: Challenges for LRAD
Officials interviewed identified the following challenges for LRAD:
1. The grant is not enough, given the price of land and the plans of the beneficiaries.
2. Land owners are not willing to sell, or are demanding exorbitant prices.
3. Most white farmers do not respect the government and do not support LRAD.
4. Municipalities are not involved in assisting with projects.
5. People do not know which department does what. Despite close relations between
DLA and DoA, there is sometimes confusion, mostly arising from the high staff
turnover.
6. Beneficiaries lack skills.
7. Natural disasters such as the drought are affecting the projects.
8. People are not willing to move to where the commercial farms are.
9. People who are involved in subsistence agriculture are not ready to be involved in
commercial ventures and are not willing to take advice.
Chapter 5: The LRAD programme
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R20 000 was felt to be too small, but it
was not clear if officials felt the maximum
grant size should also be increased. Tar-
geting the poor was identified as important
as they are struggling to access the pro-
gramme and have no other access to
capital (interview 4). More training and
practical experience is required for the
beneficiaries and DLA should employ
more agricultural specialists as much of the
work is agriculture-related.
Endnotes
1. The composition of the PGC is: DLA – Director and
two Deputy Directors; Department of Public Works
– Director; Department of Agriculture – Director,
Deputy Director and a Secretary; Department of
Local Government – Director.
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The chapter first presents briefdescriptions of the different projectsand then analyses the information
gathered thematically, covering project
design and land acquisition; the beneficia-
ries; production, employment and sustaina-
bility; markets; post-transfer support; and
challenges, hopes and recommendations
of the LRAD beneficiaries.
Projects implemented by the Land Bank
are not covered here, as assessing the DLA
projects was felt to be more important,
especially as the Land Bank mandate for
LRAD implementation was withdrawn in
March 2003. In addition, limited time and
other resources were available for this
study, and it proved difficult to get access
to project information and contacts for the
Land Bank projects.
Manamead projects
There are 12 LRAD projects at Manamead,
each with an individual beneficiary. These
projects are described together in this
study as they were all implemented as part
of the same process on one large farm.
The Manamead farm is situated in the
Vhembe district, approximately 90km
north east of Polokwane. It is extensively
used for livestock and, in some places,
dryland cropping. The grazing is sweet
veld and shrubs and is of good quality,
provided there is reasonable rainfall
(interview 4).
The Manamead farm was a state-owned
cattle farm acquired by the government in
the mid-1980s for incorporation into the
former homeland of Venda. The farm
was run as a cattle farm by the Venda
government and then by the Agriven
parastatal (interview 5). The current
farmers remember it as being a very pro-
ductive cattle farm until the early 1990s
when it was more or less abandoned
(Wegerif 2003). In 1994, just before the
end of apartheid and the dissolution of the
homeland governments, the Venda Land
Board, established by the Venda admini-
stration, allocated portions of the farm to
individuals on a lease basis (interviews 4
and 5). After the first democratic elections
in 1994, Manamead was managed by the
provincial DoA in terms of a power of
attorney granted by the Minister for
Agriculture and Land Affairs. No change
was made to the lease arrangements with
the farmers (Wegerif 2003).
The same leaseholders who were
allocated the land in 1994 became the
LRAD beneficiaries in 2002. A number of
the respondents, when asked how they got
involved in the project and acquired the
land, referred to the procedure in 1994, as
this was when they were first allocated the
land. In 1994 notices were placed in the
Venda DoA offices announcing the
intention to lease the land, and others
heard through word of mouth. All of the
successful applicants were prominent
business people or civil servants. It
appears that they all knew each other or
at least knew the Chairperson of the Land
Chapter 6: LRAD projects in
Limpopo
This chapter presents more detailed information on the LRAD projects
implemented by DLA in Limpopo. This information was largely obtained
from interviews with the beneficiaries themselves and from site visits.
Information provided by DLA and other respondents with knowledge of
the projects was also utilised.
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Board (Nefale 2003a). The Chairperson of
the Board was also allocated a piece of
land – the second largest piece – and is
now also one of the LRAD beneficiaries.
While all respondents claimed to have held
and used the land on a lease basis, it emer-
ged that they did not actually pay any rent
during the nine years that they had
occupied the farms (interview 5).
The beneficiaries did not take any
initiative to apply for the LRAD grant; a
number of officials, including the Provin-
cial Director for Land Affairs and senior
officials from DoA came to explain the
LRAD programme to them on 21 January
2001 (Wegerif 2003). The DoA and DLA
had decided that they would dispose of the
farms as part of the programme of state
land disposal and LRAD (interview 3).
For a period after this there were regular
monthly meetings at the farm where the
officials from DLA came to brief the
farmers on the progress of the grant
application and to collect any outstanding
information and forms. Thus the benefi-
ciaries found applying for LRAD rather
easy and reported that it did not tax their
time or resources (Kalauba 2003). The
only problem consistently raised by the
beneficiaries was the slow pace of the
process. The initial meeting was in January
2001, DLA documents confirm that the
projects were approved on 7 December
2001, but beneficiaries were only advised
in March 2002. At the time of the inter-
views in April 2003 the beneficiaries had
still not received the title deeds (Wegerif
2003).
The farmers each have their own piece
of land on the farm, the same portions
originally allocated to them in 1994, and
make their own decisions about what to do
on that land. However they operated as a
group in the process of accessing the
LRAD grants and co-operated in a number
of other activities such as pumping water
from a common borehole (Wegerif 2003).
The landholdings acquired range in
size from 159–461ha. The beneficiaries
received grants of R33 000–R100 000 to
buy the land. In addition to the grants, six
of the 12 farmers received loans from the
Table 7: The projects at Manamead
Beneficiary Hectares Grant* Loan Own Number of
(R) (R) contribution**(R) cattle#
Mafadza 461 76 951 29 604 166 700 56
Ramuthaga 185 38 000 0 20 000
Tlou 328 38 000 21 874 821 235 55
Tshikororo 375 78 090 31 497 173 350
Phume 256 52 000 0 60 000
Phadziri 235 48 000 0 50 000
Nyambeni 231 48 000 0 50 000
Netshilema 373 100 000 8 000 495 500 1161
Netshifhefhe 231 48 000 0 50 000 802
Nengovhela 451 84 392 9 854 242 600 96
Mudunungu 159 33 000 0 20 000 41
Mudau 264 72 874 1 444 167 300 64
* Information from DLA, but not confirmed by the beneficiaries since they did not have the information.
** Information from DLA, all contributions in the form of assets.
# Limited to the numbers of cattle of interviewed beneficiaries.
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Land Bank, organised for them by DLA,
ranging from R1 444–R31 497 (Makha-
ramedzha 2002). The land was valued by
the Land Bank at production value and
acquired for the beneficiaries at an average
price of R223.71 per hectare. It appears
that the grant and loan amounts were cal-
culated to just cover the cost of the land,
since there was no finance available for
any other purpose.
Of the seven respondents from Man-
amead who were interviewed, six were
business people, with shops, butcheries,
cafes or taxi operations, and one was a
civil servant in the Department of Health.
All of them live and have their other
businesses quite far from the Manamead
farms. For example a number of them live
around Thohoyandou and Sibasa, over
100km away, and some stay in villages
that are even further. A few live nearer in
Makhado (about 45km) and Madombidzha
(about 50km). None of them are full-time
farmers, most of them coming to the farm
only about once a week.
There is no indication of any change in
production resulting from the initiation of
the LRAD project and the farms continue
with the same basic operations that have
been going on since 1994–95 when the
beneficiaries were granted access to the
land under lease arrangements. All the
farms are used almost exclusively for beef
cattle farming. There has also been no
change in employment with all the
respondents employing only one or two
workers. All the workers are men and are
employed as labourers and to keep watch
over the farms and the cattle.
Steilloop projects
There are five LRAD projects on the
Steilloop farms, each with an individual
beneficiary. The projects were imple-
mented as part of the same process by
DLA and will be dealt with together in this
section. The Steilloop farms are situated in
the Waterberg District about 120km west
of Polokwane. It is an arid area mostly
used for cattle and, more recently, game
farming (Kwinda 2003; Nefale 2003b).
The Steilloop farms were state farms,
like Manamead, bought by the South
African Development Trust for incorpo-
ration into a homeland, in this case
Lebowa. The farms were never handed
over to Lebowa and, since their purchase,
have been leased out to different farmers
(Nefale 2003b).
All of the five LRAD beneficiaries in the
project started leasing the farms around
1997 (interview 15) as part of a farmer
settlement programme of the DoA. The
farms available for lease were advertised
and a screening process undertaken, with
priority being given to those living near to
the farms (interview 32). The respondents
say they heard about the leasing of the
farms and applied individually to the DoA.
They were interviewed by DoA officials
Table 8: The projects at Steilloop
Beneficiary Hectares Grant Loan Own Number of Other
(R) (R) contribution (R) cattle production
Sikanka 1 710 100 000 219 000 185 000 130
Kgatla 1 580 100 000 299 582 102 000 197 50 goats,
30 sheep
Morapedi 1 628 100 000 335 000 70 000 130
Lehong 1 470 100 000 233 396 170 000 125
Not known* 1 674 100 000 333 400 100 000
* DLA supplied information only on the farm name. This beneficiary was the only one at Steilloop not
interviewed.
Source: Beneficiaries and DLA.
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and later told they were successful and
could lease the farms.
The LRAD programme was initiated in
2001 by the DoA, which sent officials to
explain the LRAD programme to the
farmers who were leasing the land. The
beneficiaries were told that the government
wanted to get rid of all the farms they
owned and were therefore offering them
for sale to the leaseholders (interview 14).
They were encouraged to apply for LRAD
grants and assisted with filling in the
required forms. It was explained that the
grant would reduce the amount of money
they would need to borrow to buy the
land, and that they would receive the land
at less than the market price.
While the beneficiary perceptions of the
process are positive, there is some confu-
sion about the time frames for project
application and approval. DLA lists all the
projects on the Steilloop farms as having
been approved on 12 November 2001,
except that of Mr Lehong on Vergenoeg
that was approved on 2 August 2002.
However the beneficiaries report having
been formally told of the approval only in
September 2002 according to Mr Kgatla
(interview 15) and even January 2003
according to Mrs Morapedi (interview 17).
At the time of the interviews in March
2003 they were still waiting for the title
deeds, a factor hampering their ability to
obtain further loans. Some are not even
sure of the exact size of the land they now
own (interviews 13 and 14). Despite these
uncertainties, they noted that from the time
of filling in the forms they were given
strong assurances by the officials that their
applications would be accepted. According
to DLA the problems of establishing the
correct land size stem from the use of old
data that turned out to be inaccurate. They
have since appointed surveyors to clarify
the exact boundaries and farm sizes, and
will update this information on their
records of approved projects (interview 33).
The farms acquired range in size from
1 470ha–1 710ha and all are being used
for cattle farming. All beneficiaries got the
maximum R100 000 grant and also
received substantial loans in the range
R219 000–R333 400 from the Land Bank.
The loans were organised by DLA as part
of the LRAD process, and the full loan and
grant amounts were used for the purchase
of the land. As in Manamead a production
valuation rather than market valuation was
done by the Land Bank and all the farms
were obtained at a very reasonable price
(an average of R232.94 per hectare). As
one of the beneficiaries said, ‘I can say it
was for free, because it was not very
expensive’ (interview 17).
There are five beneficiaries, four men
and one woman, four of whom were inter-
viewed for this study. All of the beneficia-
ries are full-time farmers although Mrs
Morapedi is also a part time councillor in
the local municipality and has a sewing
business as well (interview 17). They live
in villages about 40km away, although two
of them are now living on the farms at
least some of the time.
The production on the farms is pri-
marily beef cattle, with Mr Kgatla also
keeping some goats and sheep. Three of
the respondents employ two people each,
and one employs three people. Three re-
spondents also mentioned having family
members who assist. All of those em-




This is one of the two group projects
that have been approved. It involves 30
beneficiaries, of whom 29 are women. All
the women are from Mankweng and are
members of the ANC Women’s League.
The man was working and living on the
identified farm for the previous owner and
has knowledge of the farm and farming in
general (interview 36). Mankweng is a
township about 35km to the east of
Polokwane. The farm that the group is
being assisted to purchase is located on the
Polokwane-Dendron road (on the other
side of Polokwane from Mankweng) and is
about 60km from where most of the
beneficiaries live (Kalauba 2003).
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The group first heard about the LRAD
programme at a local meeting organised
by the Polokwane Municipality at which
the DLA Provincial Director spoke about
LRAD. They also heard about it on the
radio. The Provincial Director is from the
area and helped by advising them ‘as a
local woman’ (interview 36). The group
applied some time in early 2002 and was
told the project was approved around July
of the same year, although according to
DLA records it was approved on 2 August
2002. However, at the time of the inter-
view in March 2003, the project partici-
pants had not yet received the transfer of
the land or started production.
Members of the group travelled at their
own initiative and cost to the DLA office
in Polokwane to make and follow up on
the applications. The project members
incurred a lot of transport costs travelling
to the DLA office and felt that the process
was slow and inefficient with ‘a lot of
hassles’ (interview 19). This contributed to
a number of group members dropping out
when they saw no progress in the project.
The LRAD application itself went rea-
sonably smoothly; problems seem to have
arisen with registering a trust and the
transfer of title on the property.
The members of the group rejected the
agents appointed by DLA to register the
trust and this caused some tensions
between the group and the DLA Project
Officer whom the Chairperson of the
group referred to as ‘unco-operative and
rude’ (interview 19). The Chairperson
complained that she was instructed by the
Project Officer to sign blank forms that she
was told were for the change of ownership,
but at the time of the interview the group
had still not been able to take occupation
of the farm. She was also asked to sign a
form to confirm receipt of the grant
money, but refused to sign, as the group
had received no money.
The group members are unemployed
although they have an existing project on
some land close to Mankweng and have
managed to sell some produce to a local
school. They have no experience of
commercial farming, but have been doing
subsistence farming.
The ‘own contribution’ of the benefi-
ciaries to the project was in the form of
labour and calculated at R5 000 per
person, making a total of R150 000. They
did not get any loan or make any con-
tribution of assets. Each beneficiary was
allocated the minimum grant of R20 000
and these grants were combined to give
the group access to R600 000. The project
is to acquire a 24ha farm from a white land
owner for the asking price of R280 000, an
amount that had been confirmed by a
valuer as a fair market price. The balance
of the grant is to be used for the purchase
of a vehicle and other equipment needed
for the project.
Production has not started as the land
transfer has not gone through, but it is the
intention of the project to grow mealies
and other vegetables for their own use and
to sell locally.
Vaalkop
Vaalkop is a 1 897ha piece of land that
was part of a mission station owned by the
Catholic Church. It is located about 30km
south west of Polokwane in the former
homeland of Lebowa. There has been a
community living on the land for gene-
rations. They are descendents of the early
converts who came to stay close to the
church. No interview was conducted with
the beneficiaries, but information was
obtained from the DoA and DLA
(interviews 32 and 33).
The LRAD project was initiated by the
church that approached DLA for assistance
when it wished to dispose of the land to
the community living there. The land was
donated by the church and all those al-
ready living on it are listed by DLA as the
LRAD beneficiaries. This project has by
far the largest number of beneficiaries of
DLA-implemented LRAD projects in
Limpopo, accounting for 203 out of a
total of 251 (that is, over 80%) (Makhara-
medzha 2002).
The own contribution by the benefi-
ciaries was in the form of their labour and
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calculated by DLA at the amount of
R5 000 per person. There was no loan
component or assets included as contri-
bution to the project. The grant money
they are entitled to, R4 060 000 in total, is
to be used for development on the land
(interview 32; Makharamedzha 2003). No
implementation had taken place at the time
this research was conducted and there
were no plans for any change to the land-
use. Given the number of people already
living on the land, the project is largely
providing residential land, although there
should be some opportunity for small-scale
agricultural projects.
Vele Farm
The Vele farm project involved an indivi-
dual beneficiary, Mr Tshivase, purchasing
a private farm that is registered as portion 13
of Spitskop. The 614.9ha farm is about
42km west of Makhado, where Mr Tshi-
vase lives. The land in the area is fertile
and used for livestock, dryland agriculture
and cash crops under irrigation (Vele Farm
Project 2002).
No interview was conducted with the
beneficiary, but information was obtained
from the DLA Project Officer, a researcher
from the Human Sciences Research
Council who had interviewed the benefi-
ciary, the Deeds Office, and the Registrar
of Companies. This project turned out to
be the only one implemented by DLA up
to the end of March 2003 that involved
the redistribution of land that had been
white-owned, and the only transfer that
had taken place to a person who was not
already occupying and using the land.
Mr Tshivase initiated the project himself
as he wanted a farm. He approached an
estate agent to assist in identifying a
suitable farm and went to the regional
office of the DoA to get assistance with a
business plan. He had read about LRAD,
and the DoA officials gave him contact
information for DLA so that he could
apply (interview 36).
The intended farm use, according to the
business plan, is livestock and cash crops.
The farm had previously been used for
grazing and also has 6ha of mango
orchards and 1ha of cultivated land. (Vele
Farm Project 2002). The farm was
purchased for R560 000 with R460 000
paid cash by Mr Tshivase and DLA
contributing the maximum LRAD grant of
R100 000 (Makharamedzha 2002). Mr
Tshivase raised the cash component
through an overdraft with a private bank
(interview 36).
 The farm is registered in the name of
Nzwalo Investments CC, although the
business plan approved by DLA names Mr
Tshivase as the sole beneficiary. However
Nzwalo Investments is a close corporation
that was set up in 1998 with two directors,
one being Mr Tshivase, who has a 40%
stake in the company, and the other being
a Mr Themeli who has a 60% stake in the
company (Registrar of Companies 2004).
Another anomaly is that DLA has recorded
it as approved in June 2002 and land
transfer as taking place in August 2002
(Makharamedzha 2002). However, the
records in the Deeds Office show the
purchase date to be 1 March 2002, three
months before the LRAD grant was
approved (Deeds Office 2004). It was
beyond the scope of this study to
investigate these matters further.
When the Human Sciences Research
Council interviewed Mr Tshivase in June
2003, it was found that he had started
operations on the Vele farm with 30 pigs
and 100 indigenous chickens and, by the
time of the interview, had 66 cattle and
100 pigs. Three labourers were employed
on the farm, all of whom brought useful
experience as they had all worked on
farms for years. Mr Tshivase claimed that
he was still subsidising the farm from his
other business interests, but according to
his plans he would start making a profit
after two years (interview 36).
Bellevue
Bellevue is a farm in the Roedtan area
about 120km south of Polokwane. The
Roedtan area is very flat with a mixture of
agricultural activities including crops such
as maize, vegetables with irrigation, and
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cattle farming. Bellevue was a state farm,
like the Steilloop and Manamead farms,
and Mr Kutumela has been leasing it for
about six years after it was made available
by the DoA.
Mr Kutumela applied for the LRAD
grant in 2002 after hearing about it at the
Zebediela Farmers’ Union meeting. He did
not remember how long the application
process took, but it was not long, ‘just a
few months’ (interview 16). Strangely
DLA does not have the project listed as
approved, so the project is not included in
the statistics given for approved projects in
Chapter 5 above. The researchers were
referred to Mr Kutumela by the DLA
Project Officer responsible for that district.
Mr Kutumela believed his project had been
approved during 2002.
The farm is approximately 1 450ha of
land paid for by an LRAD grant and Mr
Kutumela’s own cash contribution that
came from his pension payout when he
retired as a policeman. He now works full-
time on the farm. He employs seven
workers, three women and four men, and
his son is also assisting him with the
farming. The main activity on the farm
is cattle farming and there are currently
120 cattle. There are also some sheep and
goats. The relatively large number of
employees are required to assist in clearing
the land of dense thorny bush that
negatively affects the grazing capacity.
Project design and land
acquisition
Contrary to the LRAD policy that envisages
a ‘demand directed’ process (DLA 2001:6)
most of the projects in this study were
initiated by DLA and DoA because they
are on what was state land and the decision
had been taken to dispose of that land
through LRAD. This approach raises
another question about the extent to which
such land transfers are addressing the
racial inequality in land access in South
Africa. LRAD sets as a primary objective
the redistribution to ‘black people’ of 30%
of ‘white commercial farmland’(DLA
2001:6) yet only the land acquired for the
Vele and Mankweng Integrated projects
fits that description.
Despite not significantly contributing
to land redistribution, the LRAD projects
implemented in Limpopo may have value
as tenure upgrading projects. The benefi-
ciaries have certainly benefited in terms
of being assisted to purchase land at very
preferential rates. For example Mr Netshi-
lema (interview 6) at Manamead had to
pay just R8 000 for his 373ha farm. His
existing assets were considered to be his
contribution to the project and calculated
to be of sufficient value for him to get the
maximum grant of R100 000. Calculated
at a production value of R231 per hectare,
the total land price was R108 000. The
R8 000 was paid with a Land Bank loan
organised by DLA. Six of the beneficiaries
at Manamead are becoming owners of
farms ranging from 139–256ha without
having to borrow or contribute any money
themselves. The beneficiaries interviewed
also appreciated that they were able to
acquire land without being required to
have their own finance or collateral.
Worryingly, a number of the respon-
dents at Manamead did not know the value
of the land they had received, the size of
the grants they are purported to have re-
ceived, or the amount of their own contri-
bution to the projects. This is probably due
to the way the projects were initiated and
administered entirely by DLA and further
illustrates a lack of ‘ownership’ of the
process by the beneficiaries. Beneficiaries
of the Mankweng Integrated project made
‘own contributions’ in the form of labour,
valued at R5 000 per person, and the entire
land cost was covered by the grant. In the
Vaalkop project the land was donated and
the beneficiaries were allocated grants of
R20 000 each based on their own
contribution of R5 000 each in the form
of labour. At Steilloop the beneficiaries
acquired much larger farms and had to
borrow substantial amounts of money,
from R219 000–R335 000, to cover the
cost of the land purchased. A number of
the respondents complained about the
difficulty of paying off these loans.
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However there is no doubt that the
combination of the grant, the low (that is,
production value) valuation of the land,
and the DLA-organised loans from the
Land Bank, has still given them a
significant benefit.
In all the individual projects on state
land, the amount of the grant and the loan
provided for the projects was calculated to
just cover the land price, leaving no
additional finance for any improvements in
infrastructure or production. This despite
many of the respondents saying that their
reason for agreeing to take up the LRAD
opportunity was in order to make inves-
tments in improvements such as boreholes
or improving the grazing. Not surprisingly,
access to finance was identified by benefi-
ciaries as the major constraint preventing
further improvements.
The Manamead and Mankweng Integra-
ted projects show through very different
examples that the use of beneficiaries’
‘own contribution’ is not achieving the
intended outcome of ensuring commitment
to the project. LRAD reduces the asses-
sment of beneficiary commitment to purely
financial terms and, in practice, this has
often become a book entry not necessarily
reflecting any actual input to the project.
At Manamead the beneficiaries did not
bring any assets to the projects. The assets
they were already using were valued and
put down as their own contribution. The
relatively small place the farms have in the
business operations and lives of many of
the Manamead beneficiaries raises ques-
tions about their level of commitment.
In the Mankweng Integrated project the
labour contribution has simply been
calculated at the maximum amount of
R5 000 per person. This has done nothing
to confirm or build commitment, as evi-
denced by members dropping out of the
project before it started production despite
their supposed R5 000 investment.
The speed of processing of LRAD
applications seems to have been improving
over the years with the Manamead projects
that started in 2001 taking more than a
year from initiation to approval, while
projects like Mankweng Integrated and
Vele that were initiated in 2002 took less
than six months. A year after project
approval, however, land titles had still not
been transferred to some beneficiaries.
Communication, while very good on some
projects in initial phases, has been erratic
when it comes to informing beneficiaries
about project approval and the dates of
land transfer. For example, there are gaps
of months between decisions being taken
by the PGC and communication of these
decisions to beneficiaries.
Business planning was done by the
Agricultural Research Council for the
projects at Manamead and Steilloop and by
DoA and DLA officials for the others.
Vaalkop was the only DLA-implemented
project where the planning grant was
actually spent. The business plans may
have served an administrative purpose for
the DLA, but there was no sign that the
plans were having any effect on the nature
of the production on the farms. Most of the
beneficiaries who are expected to imple-
ment the plans knew nothing about them.
Of the 14 beneficiaries interviewed, only
three had seen the business plans for their
projects, although even they did not have
copies of them. These three indicated that
they were quite happy with the business
planning process. Seven respondents said
they knew nothing about any business
plans, while the remaining four had heard
about business planning, but knew little
about what was in the plans.
None of the projects involved any de-
concentration of landholding, a central
factor in the success of international land
reforms that have brought increased pro-
ductivity and contributed to economic
growth and poverty reduction. All the
projects acquired and continued to use
land in the same ‘economic units’ as
before and continued with the same land
use and modes of production that had
existed before the land transfer.
The beneficiaries
The individual projects involve benefi-
ciaries who are either business people or
civil servants (current or retired). Many
benefited because they had the where-
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withal, information and contacts to obtain
state land on a lease basis some years ago.
Due to holding the leases, they then
became the lucky beneficiaries of a
government decision to dispose of that
land through LRAD. Mr Tshivase, who
acquired a white-owned farm, had access
to significant credit and an ability to seek
out the professional assistance he needed,
for example approaching the estate agent
and finalising a deal with the landowner.
Mr Kutumela had a civil servant’s retire-
ment package to enable him to make the
investment required.
The group beneficiaries appear to be
largely poor rural dwellers. However, they
were not without some useful connections.
The Vaalkop project was an initiative of the
church that owned the land. The initiation
of the Mankweng Integrated project was
assisted by the beneficiaries being both
ANC Women’s League members who
attend municipal meetings, and the fact
that they came from the same community
as the Provincial Director of Land Affairs
(interview 19).
Some of the respondents have experi-
ence of farming, mostly gained from their
parents on communal land. For example
Mr Ramuthaga (interview 5) said he started
gaining farming knowledge from his father
at the age of 12. He then bought some of
his own cattle in 1992 and kept them on
communal land. Others have been farming
as far back as 1970 and have farmed in a
number of different communal areas
(interview 6). Only one farm worker has
become a beneficiary and that was in the
Mankweng Integrated project, where the
project incorporated an existing worker
on the land (interview 19). Other farm
workers who are involved remain as




As there has been no change in the
production on any of the farms due to
LRAD, with the possible exception of the
Vele project, one cannot claim any positive
production impact nor any increase in
employment. The farming operations on
the state land that makes up most of the
land transferred were run by the same
farmers before the LRAD initiative. The
Vaalkop project has not involved any
change in living or production patterns as
yet, and would appear to be more orien-
tated to housing, given the number of
people involved who all live on the land.
The Mankweng Integrated project has not
yet started production, but the fact that it is
providing less than one hectare per bene-
ficiary indicates that the project will
struggle to create a livelihood for those
involved.
The individually-owned farms employ
from 1–7 people per farm, with most of
them employing only one or two people.
These employees are all labourers and
from discussions with the farmers it
emerged that they are paid around R300
per month. The workers also receive
benefits such as accommodation and
sometimes maize meal and access to fresh
milk from the cows. There does not seem
to be any intention to comply with the
legal minimum wage for agricultural
workers.3
This study did not include any detailed
economic or livelihood analysis of the
projects, which would be a useful topic for
further research. However, some of the
information provided by beneficiaries
gives an indication of the benefit of the
land to them. The farmers at Steilloop, and
Mr Kutumela, all rely primarily on farming
for their livelihoods and some of them
report making a reasonable income. Mr
Kgatla sold 65 cattle in 2002 and said he
made around R165 000 (interview 15).
Mr Lehong was also confident that he is
making a reasonable profit and claimed
that he now has two cars and is able to
send his children to school and college
(interview 13).
The farmers at Manamead, and Mr
Tshivase of the Vele Project, all rely on
other sources of livelihood and some of
them reported that they are currently
subsidising the farms with their own
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money from other sources (interviews 3
and 36). A number of the farmers with
land at Manamead have access to other
land in communal areas and run busines-
ses such as butcheries. They clearly use
the Manamead land as part of larger
farming and businesses operations (Nefale
2003a; Kalauba 2003; Wegerif 2003).
According to the respondents, the
Manamead farms have a carrying capacity4
of around 5–5.5ha per large stock unit and
the Steilloop farms have a carrying
capacity of 11–14ha per large stock unit.
Information on carrying capacity was not
available for the other projects. Some of
the beneficiaries had been informed of
these figures by the DoA, but others were
not aware of the carrying capacity of their
land. All of the farmers interviewed, except
two,5 have herds that exceed the carrying
capacity of their farms. These herds ex-
ceed the carrying capacity by an average
of 44%, raising a concern about the long-
term sustainability of the farms.
Markets
The main product of all the farms acquired
through LRAD and currently in use is
cattle. The marketing and sale of cattle is
primarily done through the Vleissentraal6
auctions at the nearest auction point from
the farms. For the Manamead farmers this
is only about 20km away, at Bandelierkop.
The Steilloop farmers go to Baltimore,
which is about 30km away, and sometimes
travel further to auctions in Ellisrus and
Potgietersrus, both about 100km away.
The farmers are able to sell all the cattle
that they take to these auctions, but not all
were satisfied with the prices and treatment
they receive. The majority of respondents
had no problem with the auctions and
some said they were happy to be able to
compete and sometimes do better in terms
of quality of cattle and price received than
the white farmers (interviews 12 and 17;
Kalauba 2003). However four respondents
reported experiencing racism. There were
reports of auctioneers using certain com-
ments to indicate when cattle came from
black owners and that these cattle then
received lower bids (interview 11). One of
the respondents believes there is nepotism
and noted that all the salespeople he has
seen are white, except one who used to be
there to sell livestock from state farms
(interview 10).
Most respondents said they get no
assistance with the marketing aside from
Vleissentraal supplying the calendars of
auction days and, in some cases, phoning
to tell them about prevailing prices. Ms
Morapedi, a farmer at Steilloop, used to get
the auction dates from Vleissentraal, but
has not received dates for the last year and
now obtains the information from
neighbouring farmers. Two respondents
said the auction dates were provided to
them by the DoA (interviews 12 and 13).
Some of the farmers at Manamead
slaughter their cows to sell the meat
through their own butcheries. Mr Nengho-
vhela, who has a farm at Manamead,
exchanges heifers for fully-grown cows
from people in neighbouring villages. He
then slaughters the cows and sells the meat
in his butchery.
Post-transfer support
The only form of post-transfer support
being received by the beneficiaries is
agricultural extension services. There were
mixed views on the availability and quality
of these services. Of the 12 respondents
who are engaged in production, nine said
they had access to extension services,
while three said they did not. Where the
extension services are available, the visits
of extension officers are largely on
request, or to attend meetings. There are
few regular visits and little time is spent on
the farms providing practical advice or
assistance. All four of the Steilloop farmers
interviewed said extension services were
available; the availability and quality of
services at Manamead seemed more
doubtful; and Mr Kutumela said he had no
support. Two of the Steilloop farmers were
very positive about a particular extension
officer, Mr Ngobeni, indicating the
importance of the individual on the
perception of the quality of services being
offered.
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The beneficiaries interviewed identified a
range of other support services they felt
would assist them to succeed as farmers.
The majority of respondents identified the
lack of access to finance for improvements
on the farms and expansion of production
as the most significant factor limiting them
in achieving their goals. The next most
commonly identified needs related to the
provision of water and improvement of
roads. Other requirements mentioned by
more than one respondent were: assistance
with marketing; provision of fodder during
drought periods; agricultural extension
services; and the handover of the title
deeds for the land.
All the farmers feel they could benefit
from training in a range of activities related
to the farm operations. They specifically
mentioned training in the following areas:
financial management, marketing, artificial
insemination, veld management, identify-
ing symptoms of different illnesses, appli-
cation of vaccines, financial management,
record keeping, and business skills. The
only training that has been organised for
the beneficiaries so far was a workshop on




The beneficiaries have experienced a
range of challenges as they have tried to
farm. These have included veld fires,
shortages of water, drought, poor or no
roads, damaged fences, theft of livestock
and poor disease control. In one case a
respondent believed that it was a neigh-
bouring white farmer who had burnt his
veld (interview 15). Another concern is not
being able to get further loan financing
from the Land Bank, apparently due to
limits set by the Bank (interview 16). Mr
Kutumela had particular problems, the
main one being lekkerbreek (a poisonous
plant) that killed about 30 of his cattle in
1998–99. His farm is also covered in thorn
trees that are reducing its potential for
grazing, but Mr Kutumela has been told
that he cannot cut them down due to
conservation laws.
Most respondents expressed an interest in
expanding their production through
gaining more land or improving the
carrying capacity of the land and the
quality of the livestock. For example Mr
Ramuthaga (interview 5) hopes to improve
the carrying capacity on his farm through
de-bushing, planting other grass varieties
and, if he had the money, feedlots. Other
plans that respondents have for improving
stock quality are to bring in better bulls,
improve access to water, and deal with
sicknesses. Some beneficiaries shared their
hopes for building abattoirs or expanding
into dairy farming, poultry production or
crop production.
The most common recommendation
that beneficiaries made for improving the
LRAD programme was to increase the
grant size. This was also motivated by
some as a way to reduce their debt and the
risk that they may not be able to repay the
loans. The Mankweng Integrated group
also wanted grant money to come straight
into the group’s own account, with DLA
monitoring the expenditure, rather than the
current system where DLA holds the
money and manages the expenditure.
While calling for more access to finance,
some beneficiaries suggested that the Land
Bank should not repossess the farms if the
owners default on debt payments. One
respondent emphasised that the Bank
should write off any debts if losses were
suffered due to natural disasters. Another
suggested that more should be done to
ensure that the beneficiaries have the
knowledge, skills and commitment to use
the land productively.
Endnotes
1. He moved cattle from Nwanedi farms, in former
Venda because the drought was bad there. His
intention was to move some of the cattle to
Malumulele, in the former Gazankulu, where he has
access to communal grazing that he believed would
be better (Wegerif 2003).
2. He usually kept about 80 cattle at the farm, but due to
drought he had just moved cattle ‘home’ to a
communal area in former Venda, and was left with
30 at Manamead at the time of the interview.
3. Minimum wages for the agricultural sector came into
Chapter 6: LRAD projects in Limpopo
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force in April 2003, just a few weeks before the
interviews were conducted. The minimum wages
were set at R800 per month in certain magisterial
districts (‘Area A’) and R650 per month in
magisterial districts with lower per capita income
levels (‘Area B’).
4. The amount of land needed per large stock unit
(approximately equivalent to one cow) for
sustainable production.
5. One of the two who are not overgrazing is building
up the herd, while the other had been forced to sell
some cattle in order to make the loan payments to the
Land Bank.
6. Vleissentraal is a private company that sets up and
manages cattle auctions.
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Of all the land acquired in terms ofapproved LRAD projects handledby DLA in the province, 95.5%
was already occupied and used by the
intended beneficiaries and 82% was state
land bought by the apartheid regime for
incorporation into former homelands as
part of the scheme of grand apartheid. The
implementation of these LRAD projects on
state land has merely completed a project
initiated by the apartheid regime some 20
years ago. The transfer of these farms in
ownership to those who were already
leasing them has done nothing to change
the racial inequalities or structure of the
agricultural sector in the country.
Out of the 20 projects approved, only
two actually involve the redistribution of
‘white commercial farmland’ as envisaged
by the LRAD programme (DLA 2001).
These two are the Mankweng Integrated
project and the Vele Farm project. As
Mankweng Integrated had not yet been
implemented at the time of the research
(April 2003), this meant only one benefi-
ciary out of 251 had actually acquired
ownership of land in a previously ‘white’
area.
One of the key targets for LRAD is to
contribute to the redistribution of 30% of
agricultural land over a period of 15 years.
The LRAD programme in Limpopo in its
first years of implementation up to March
2003 had approved the acquisition of
22 292ha of land, counting both the DLA
and Land Bank projects. This is equivalent
to just 0.9% of the agricultural land in the
formerly white areas of the province.
This is being generous to the programme,
however, as many of the projects had not
reached the point of land transfer and, as
noted above, almost all the land to be
acquired through LRAD was not actually
in white ownership but had already been
allocated for black use by the apartheid
government and was already being used
by black farmers. Clearly the programme
is falling dramatically short of its own
targets and making a negligible impact on
the unequal and highly concentrated
patterns of land ownership.
It is important to consider whether
LRAD represents any improvement over
the SLAG programme it replaced. While
the procedures for the approval of LRAD
projects have been streamlined to some
extent, the programme continues to rely on
the willingness of sellers and a narrow
‘demand-led’ approach. There is no in-
crease in the amount of land provided
through LRAD (22 292ha in three years)
over that redistributed through the SLAG
approach (45 110ha in six years). The
SLAG projects, despite all their drawbacks,
did acquire land in formerly white areas.
SLAG also involved far more beneficiaries:
6 753 households against the 376 indivi-
dual beneficiaries of DLA and Land Bank
LRAD projects combined.
Surprisingly, while LRAD sets new
targets for the amount of land to be
redistributed, the budget allocations for its
implementation have been reduced and are
a fraction of what is needed to meet the
stated targets (Tilley 2002).
Chapter 7: Conclusions
This study set out to critically examine the implementation of LRAD in
Limpopo as an example of a market-based land redistribution programme.
The major finding that emerges from the study is that LRAD, as it has
been implemented in Limpopo, is neither a redistribution programme nor
is it market-based.
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This study found that there had not been
an open process for the selection of
beneficiaries, aside from the Vele project,
as only those who already had access to
the land were offered the opportunity and
took it. When they first gained access to
the land, on a lease basis, it was also not
through an open process or involving any
market forces. In the case of Vaalkop, the
beneficiaries were a community which had
been on the land for generations due to
their affiliation with a particular church. At
Manamead, businessmen and civil servants
with good political connections gained
access to the land free of charge through
the old Venda Land Board. On the Steil-
loop farms, the beneficiaries applied to
lease the land and went through a selection
process that may have been fair, but was
not linked to market forces. Although not
yet implemented, it is interesting to note
that even the Mankweng Integrated project
seems to have benefited from political
connections. The beneficiaries are all
members of the ANC Women’s League,
live in the same area as the Director of the
DLA Provincial Office, and received her
advice and assistance. All of these projects
show in different ways how political,
community or religious contacts have
given certain people access to information
and/or influence that has played a key role
in their access to the land and ultimately
the LRAD grant. There is no sign of a sys-
tematic programme from which landless
people without substantial resources, a
particular power base, or good contacts
could be expected to benefit.
The price of 95% of the land approved
for acquisition was not determined by the
market. The state land was valued by the
Land Bank at production values that were
well below the market value and, in the
case of Vaalkop, the land was donated by
the church. This is not necessarily a
problem, but it renders redundant the
motivation for the state to give grants in
the first place, which is to assist those
without access to equity to acquire land
through the market at prices above the
capitalised value of potential production
profits (Van Zyl 1996; World Bank 2003).
The valuing of state land at production
value is positive in that it gives the bene-
ficiaries access to more land than might be
acquired through the market at a given
grant level, and could be seen as an
appropriate use of state resources.
However, it represents a substantial
benefit and creates an inequality between
beneficiaries who acquire private land and
those who acquire state land. These factors
make transparency and fairness essential
in the beneficiary selection process. It is
questionable, especially in the case of
Manamead, whether the state farms targe-
ted for LRAD projects should have been
given to the people already occupying
them. There was no transparent process
and no opportunity for other people who
may well have had greater interest,
potential or need to benefit.
The Vele project is an interesting
exception in that it appears to have been a
case of an individual with resources and
initiative going out to find land on the
market and obtaining financial assistance
from the DLA for the purchase of the farm.
An estate agent performed the role one
would expect, a willing seller was found,
the beneficiary raised his own resources
and applied for the grant, and the deal
went through. This looks like the kind of
project that one would expect to find being
implemented under LRAD. As this was the
only project of its kind that DLA imple-
mented, it is not possible to generalise too
much from the experience of Vele.
However it is very clear that the person
involved had access to substantial financial
resources from existing business ope-
rations that favourably positioned him
to access a bank overdraft of almost
R500 000 and to subsidise his farming
operations during its initial years. It would
also appear that he intended going ahead
with a land purchase of this nature whether
he obtained the LRAD grant or not – he
certainly had access to sufficient capital.
The LRAD grant did no more than put an
extra R100 000 in the pocket of someone
who already had substantial resources. The
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Vele project does not represent a route to
land ownership that a person with more
modest resources could take.
All the young people and almost all the
women beneficiaries are members of
group projects, whereas the individual
beneficiaries are almost exclusively older
men. This indicates the difficulty women
and youth will have in benefiting indivi-
dually and the important role that group
projects can play in benefiting the margi-
nalised. All the beneficiaries interviewed,
with the exception of the women from
Mankweng Integrated project, were rea-
sonably well-off and could certainly not
be described as poor.
Despite not fitting the descriptions of
how market-based programmes are meant
to work, experience in Limpopo has con-
firmed the concerns of critics that it is the
richer and more powerful who will benefit
the most from LRAD. This has happened
not so much because of their wealth, but
because of their access to information
and political influence. Far from endea-
vouring to bring poorer people into the
programme, DLA and the DoA have gone
out of their way to benefit those already
better off and already benefiting from
state land, while making access to the
programme expensive (in time and
transport) for poorer people, and almost
totally inaccessible for the very poor.
A number of the larger farms at Steil-
loop and the one at Roedtan are already
generating a reasonable income for the
beneficiaries, and it would appear that this
could be improved substantially with fur-
ther investment, training and support. The
Manamead farms may not be viable as
stand-alone enterprises, but they could be
more productive with increased investment
and improved commitment to the project
from the beneficiaries. The land at Mana-
mead also appears to be adding value for
some farmers as part of a broader and
more complex set of farming and business
activities.
The difficulty of obtaining access to
finance was a complaint from almost every
beneficiary, and was seen as a major
constraint to their operations. In a bizarre
twist, even the quite wealthy beneficiaries
are still struggling to get finance to
improve their operations and unlock the
potential of the land. It is unfortunate that
the opportunities provided by LRAD to
inject additional capital, over and above
the purchase of land, were not taken.
What has been hidden by the LRAD
statistics, especially when averages are
calculated, is that this is actually a two-tier
programme. There are group projects
accessing very small portions of land
(averaging 8.24ha per beneficiary, see
Table 2) and individuals obtaining large
tracts of land (averaging 679ha each).
Most of the larger individual farmers have
already accessed the maximum or close to
the maximum grant, while the members of
group projects all received the minimum
grant. Despite the concept of ‘graduation’
(NDA 2001:6) there is no reasonable
opportunity for beneficiaries to move from
lower to higher-level operations – the gap
is just too great. In practice, beneficiaries
are not aware of the possibility of ‘gradua-
ting’ to better things, nor is anything being
done to structure projects that could enable
this step up.
The projects approved have some merit
as tenure upgrades in the context of past
insecure tenure rights. Especially in the
case of Steilloop, a number of the farmers
are reasonably successful and they are the
type of emerging black middle class
farmers that many in South Africa believe
should receive support. It is hard to en-
visage a situation in South Africa today
where black farmers who have been
leasing state land for years could be
moved in order to make way for others.
Providing them with formal ownership of
the land makes a lot of sense and perhaps
in the future will encourage greater inves-
tment in the land. The Vaalkop project also
has logic as a tenure upgrading project for
the families living on the land – the land
and the grants they would potentially have
access to could be used for development
projects. However it seems that these kinds
Chapter 7: Conclusions
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of projects should be handled under a
different programme.
It is clear from South African and inter-
national experience that land redistribu-
tion, if not part of a broader development
programme accompanied by appropriate
production, marketing and other support,
will not bring improvements in produc-
tivity or other potential development
benefits. There is no evidence that the
LRAD projects are part of any wider
rural development strategy, and local
government, despite its development co-
ordination mandate, is not involved in
these cases at all. There have been no
measures to restructure and improve
access to markets or to make inputs more
accessible and affordable. Some of the
farmers benefit from agricultural extension
services, but clearly these could be impro-
ved. Existing production has continued in
cases where beneficiaries were already
established on the land, but there has been
no noticeable improvement in productivity.
The fate of any new farmer getting access
to land will be far more precarious.
 The LRAD programme in Limpopo
reflects some of the characteristics that are
often associated with land reforms that are
not market-based, such as people acces-
sing land ‘by virtue of political power and
official status, as well as granting of public
land under concessional arrangements’ (El-
Ghonemy 1999:108). So far, LRAD has
done nothing to stimulate land markets,
and has not encouraged any new invest-
ments. LRAD has not brought about any
change in existing farming operations and
has created no new jobs. It has produced
no new, smaller-scale or more efficient
farming units, and has consequently
yielded none of the benefits ascribed to
the market-based model. The poorer bene-
ficiaries, some of whom may be, or aspire
to be, peasant farmers, have not received
sufficient land to be viable commercial
enterprises and the beneficiaries who have
obtained substantial land are business
people or current and retired civil servants.
As a market-based land redistribution pro-
gramme, one would have to say that
LRAD in Limpopo is a failure.
LRAD is financed with public funds
approved by Parliament for land
redistribution. The manner in which these
funds have been used in Limpopo has
denied much-needed resources to projects
that could truly address the needs of
landless people and the stark racial
inequality in access to land. Perhaps
politicians are happy to report on the land
bought as if it were redistributed, creating
a false impression of transformation in
land access. Maybe officials have been
excessively influenced by local elites or
just taken an easier route to meeting
implementation targets. Whether LRAD
implementation in Limpopo has gone the
route it has by accident or design, it cannot
be seen as an acceptable use of public
resources.
Perhaps even more unfortunate than the
inappropriate use of resources allocated for
redistribution is the waste of an
opportunity for land redistribution to
become an engine for economic growth in
impoverished rural areas. Empirical
evidence from around the world has
shown that effective land redistribution can
create growth in agricultural production
that can, in turn, make a substantial
contribution to broader economic growth
and poverty reduction. The manner of
LRAD implementation in Limpopo realises
none of these benefits.
The findings of this study show that
implementation and achievements have
fallen far short of the objectives of the
LRAD programme and market-based land
reform. This leaves the question as to
whether this is an experience peculiar to
Limpopo or a fair reflection of national
and international experience. Studies by
Borras (2003) and other critics of market-
based approaches indicate that this
experience may be a common one. If this
is so, it is time for the promoters of LRAD
and market-based land reforms to accept
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